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Anna Donald Department of Epidemiology and
Public Health, University College London, London WC1E 6BT
a.donald{at}ucl.ac.uk
Every year, new health products and know-how become available:
statins, new antibiotics, telemedicine, insurance know-how, imaging
techniques, and genomics, to name a few. At the same time, major
barriers to transferring information and technology between countries
are falling with expansion of the internet and online health training
programmes, the growth of information about the relative effectiveness
of different technologies,1 and the liberalisation of
trade. It might be reasonable to expect that global transfer of health
technologies would take place more rapidly and in greater quantity
to benefit "haves" and "have nots" alike. There is no
evidence, however, that this is taking place. On the contrary,
appropriate health technologies may become more unequally distributed than ever. Why?
Economic demand for health technologies by individuals,
governments, and insurers is determined by factors such as purchasing power, technological capability, purchaser priorities, and unequal information.
Purchasing power
Table 1.
Summary points
Less than 1% of global research and development is currently
spent on technological innovations for poor countries
The World Trade Organisation agreement enforcing trademarks and patents
will increase the price poor countries pay to gain access to new,
patented technologies
It is unclear how such legislation will improve the health or wealth of
impoverished countries, in the short or long term
Active policies rather than passive diffusion are needed to distribute
new technologies to people and countries unable to generate profit for
suppliers
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Demand factors
Top
Demand factors
Supply factors
Political factors that...
References
One of the main reasons why people cannot get the health
technologies they need is because they cannot afford them. For example,
few African parents can afford the antibiotic ceftriaxone, the most
effective treatment for one of the main causes of infant death each
year, Streptococcus pneumoniae.2 Nor will most
people be able to afford medicines for cardiovascular disease, the
biggest projected killer in developing countries by 2020,3
as they exceed the annual incomes of most patients (table
1).
Technological capability
People may not get the technology they need because the country or
region lacks the structural capacity to use and maintain it. Effective
technologies for people in developing countries, such as limb
microsurgery, telemedicine, and primary care services, require a
skilled workforce, equipment, and spare parts as well as a functioning
economy and political system
requirements that many countries lack.
Technological capability can be improved by aid agencies, but usually
much greater structural change is required to enable widespread use of
new technologies. International literature is littered with examples of
well intended aid plans that underestimated requirements for
technological capability.12
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Purchasers' priorities
Another reason for people not getting the most appropriate
technology is the priorities of those who purchase health technologies
on their behalf. For example, many Roman Catholic and Islamic women
have no access to birth control because their health systems and
governments do not allow it. Donor countries and companies may buy
technologies for poorer countries according to their own needs to
expand markets or to dump irrelevant, old, or even harmful
technologies.13 Common problems affecting pharmaceutical company donations include drugs being close to expiry, irrelevant to
local people's health problems, unsorted, mislabelled, and not
complying with local standards or administrative
procedures.14
Unequal information
Finally, people may not get appropriate health technology because
they and health professionals are swayed by poor quality information,
such as advertising, rather than by independent, objective information
about the relative benefits, harms, and costs of the technology. Few
countries have health technology assessment programmes to help
discriminate between technologies; and many poor countries have no
needs based health system. In most countries branded drugs are more
popular despite being more expensive and of no better quality than
non-branded generics. This is largely because of advertising and the
absence of easily accessible information on cost effectiveness for
patients and health professionals.
15 16
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Supply factors |
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On the supply side, technology transfer is affected by how
suppliers
companies, governments, non-profit making organisations, and
international organisations
appraise the costs, risks, and likely
benefits of making health technologies available.
Cost and risks of supplying technologies
Suppliers are unlikely to spread technologies if they think the
costs and risks of doing so are too great. Costs of supplying health
technologies can be increased or offset by local tax and subsidy
policies, including assistance from research and development
programmes. Such policies usually require a stable government and legal
and money lending systems, which again are typical of richer rather
than poorer countries. Suppliers are also unlikely to sell technologies
or invest in joint ventures with countries facing the risks inherent in
major political unrest or war. The supply of medical technologies all
but collapsed, for example, in war torn Colombia and
Serbia.
17 18
Returns on investment
Suppliers' perception of benefits (returns on investment) is
perhaps the greatest factor affecting supply and distribution of health
technologies. Few suppliers are interested in developing technologies
for people unlikely to be able to pay much for them. For example, oily
suspension of chloramphenicol is as effective and easier to use than
ampicillin for treating epidemic bacterial meningitis caused by
Neisseria meningitidis and one tenth its price, but no drug
company seems interested in making it as profits would be relatively
small.2 On the other hand, companies are keen to get as
much return on past investment as possible, sometimes even for products
found to be ineffective or harmful. For example, the drug dipyrone was
withdrawn from Germany in 1987 because of adverse effects but continues
to be sold in most developing countries. It was one of India's top
selling drugs in 1995.16 Mass migration of highly trained
health professionals continues from poor countries to rich ones, where
salaries are higher and political security assured; 75% of all migrant
doctors work in the five countries Australia, Canada, Germany, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.5
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Political factors that determine demand and supply |
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Not all technology transfers are desirable. Many technologies are not cost effective and some are harmful. In terms of health gain, more important than people's capacity to obtain technologies is their ability to choose between them using sufficient information about their benefits, costs, and harms. In turn, choice of technology depends on the political relationship between those buying and selling technologies, as well as between purchasers of health care and its recipients.
Most developing countries, with gross national products far below the total sales of many large companies (table 2), lack the political muscle to set the rules determining international trade, such as the TRIPS agreement. Furthermore, individuals in many of those countries, who have no effective political representation in government or evidence based health systems, are unlikely to demand the health technologies they need and resist the ones they do not. Experience suggests that in the absence of strong, highly skilled and non-corrupt health systems, private suppliers readily sell inappropriate technologies to people ill equipped to demand anything better.
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Many people hope that liberalising information and trade will result in a trickle down of beneficial technologies to poor people. Yet there is no evidence that trickle down is likely unless enforceable mechanisms are developed to promote and distribute technologies according to health gain rather than simply for profit. These might include national and international laws to protect indigenous peoples against patents that would deprive them of local technologies or to ensure that they get a share of the profits; crossborder technology transfer arrangements; subsidies to promote the development of less profitable interventions; economic development to create sustainable markets for effective drugs, and mechanisms to increase access to reliable information about health technologies.
Several substantial programmes are currently under way. The quality of
donations by pharmaceutical companies has recently improved, perhaps
with increased awareness of problems and the development of guidelines.
It may improve further with more widespread monitoring and adherence to
recent recommendations about drug donations developed by a consensus of
stakeholders (companies, recipient governments and health facilities,
the WHO, and private voluntary organisations).22 Several
programmes currently use a variety of mechanisms to increase access to
vaccines, including subsidies and tax credits, research gifts in kind
from pharmaceutical companies, preferential investment in companies
that agree not to enforce patents in poor countries, and cash
donations.19 So far, however, none of these seems likely
to sustain research and development for poor countries at affordable
prices without the kind of global backing given to treaties like TRIPS.
It remains to be seen whether heart-lung transplants will make it to Niger.
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Acknowledgments |
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I thank Michael Anderson, Trisha Greenhalgh, and Sam Vincent for help with this article
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Footnotes |
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Competing interests: AD has advised two pharmaceutical companies about the implications of evidence based medicine for the pharmaceutical industry in the United Kingdom.
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References |
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Access to essential drugs in poor countries: a lost battle?
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| 8. | Rural Advancement Foundation International. Conserving indigenous knowledge: integrating two systems of innovation. An independent study. New York: UN Development Programme, 1994. |
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| 13. | Chetley A. Struggling for clear policies. In: A healthy business? world health and the pharmaceutical industry. London: Zed Books, 1990:68-93. |
| 14. | World Health Organisation. Guidelines for drug donations. Geneva: WHO, 1996. |
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| 19. | Balms for the poor. Economist 14 August 1999:69. |
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| 22. | An assessment of us pharmaceutical donations: players, processes, and products. In: Reich MR, ed. Boston: Harvard School of Public Health, 1999(www.hsph.harvard.edu/faculty/reich/donations) |
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