



The COVID-19 pandemic, misinformation, trust, and inequities: the case for embracing a community resilience approach in pandemic preparedness and response efforts

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Analysis

The COVID-19 pandemic, misinformation, trust, and inequities: the case for embracing a community resilience approach in pandemic preparedness and response efforts

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Key messages

- The pandemic was marked by unprecedented ability and speed to share information globally, eroding trust in institutions, and grave socioeconomic inequities that exacerbated the impact of the pandemic. These enabled an environment of misinformation and erosion of trust.
- The spread of misinformation and its impact on people's psyche are manifestations of deeper issues around trust in governments and institutions
- Despite ample evidence of their importance, communication and community engagement efforts are often not institutionalized or provided the needed resources in pandemic response efforts.
- Embracing a community resilience approach to pandemic preparedness and response requires a paradigm shift from the traditional efforts that mainly focus on immediate top-down actions during pandemics to investment in communities prior to, during, and after pandemics.

37 **Contributors and sources**

38 SMA, SFK, and MJ conceived and designed the manuscript. SMA, SFK, MJ and MV drafted
39 the manuscript with inputs from all authors. All authors contributed to revising the manuscript
40 and approved the final version. This analysis was part of the work commissioned by the
41 Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness & Response, which reviewed the national
42 responses of 28 countries. Data used for the analysis was collected through three
43 complementary methods: 1) literature review of peer-reviewed papers, policy documents,
44 public reports, and articles that examined national and sub-national policy responses, 2) semi-
45 structured interviews with country experts and national government written submission of
46 selected countries about their own account of the measures implemented to contain COVID-
47 19, 3) validation of country specific data by experts through written consultation and round
48 table discussion.

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55 independent and impartial. The views expressed in this work are solely that of the authors'
56 and do not represent the views of the Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and
57 Response.

59 **Patient involvement**

60 No patients were involved in this analysis.

62 **Conflicts of Interest**

63 We have read and understood [BMJ policy on declaration of interests](#) and have the following
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3 74 **The COVID-19 pandemic, misinformation, trust, and inequities: the case for**
4 **embracing a community resilience approach in pandemic preparedness and**
5 **response efforts**
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10 78 **Standfirst:** Salma M Abdalla and colleagues examine the contextual factors that shaped
11 79 communication and community engagement during COVID-19. They argue that the COVID-
12 80 19 highlights shortcomings in the current approach to communication and community
13 81 engagement. The authors propose that adopting a community resilience approach is
14 82 required in pandemic preparedness and response efforts.
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19 84 **Introduction**

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21 85 The COVID-19 pandemic has yet again showcased the significance of centring communities
22 86 in disease outbreaks preparedness and response efforts. Throughout the pandemic, many
23 87 communities across the world organized to tackle the virus as well as help those most affected
24 88 by the social and economic impact of the pandemic. However, the pandemic also highlighted
25 89 the challenging contextual barriers to community engagement efforts during a rapidly
26 90 spreading disease outbreak. This analysis aims to highlight the need for a paradigm shift to
27 91 centre communities in future preparedness and response efforts.
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34 93 **COVID-19 in context: the first digital pandemic, misinformation, and erosion of trust**

35 94 Communication and community engagement are often challenging during disease outbreaks
36 95 of a known pathogen. They require: ensuring people have the information needed to protect
37 96 themselves; managing anxieties; and relaying consistent, transparent updates to the public,
38 97 community institutions and leaders, and to health workers on the front lines. Even when
39 98 confined to small geographic areas, community engagement and communication efforts often
40 99 face challenges, such as communicating through different languages and dialects, and
41 100 engaging different groups that potentially have varying levels of trust in health workers and
42 101 governments, and often experience disparities in access to resources and information. These
43 102 challenges peaked during COVID-19, a period marked by an unprecedented ability and speed
44 103 to share information globally. The impact of the pandemic was exacerbated by an erosion of
45 104 trust in institutions and grave socioeconomic inequities.
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54 106 Information about what was later identified as SARS-CoV-2 spread faster globally than the
55 107 virus itself. On December 31st, 2019, an online Chinese news outlet published Wuhan
56 108 Municipal Health Commission's concern about cases of pneumonia of unknown origin. Within
57 109 three hours, ProMed-mail—an internet-based infectious diseases outbreaks reporting service
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3 110 managed by fewer than 50 part-time employees—translated and published the article online,
4 111 40 minutes before the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission issued a public bulletin.(1) By
5 112 January 1st, 2020 mainstream outlets were reporting on the outbreak, prompting the World
6 113 Health Organization (WHO) to take the unprecedented move of reporting a new outbreak
7 114 through Twitter on January 4th, 2020. Within five days, knowledge of the cluster of cases of
8 115 pneumonia of unknown origin that became known as the now-ubiquitous COVID-19 emerged
9 116 into the digital world. The demands for information were justifiable, unrelenting, and
10 117 unsatiable. Meanwhile, what was known about the virus, the damage it could do. and the
11 118 measures people should take to protect themselves, all splintered through a prism of
12 119 languages, social media feeds, biases, geopolitical tensions, fears, and divergent levels of
13 120 health literacy. Digital platforms have been inundated with COVID-19-related information since
14 121 the pandemic began in late 2019. For example, between February and November 2020,
15 122 information about the virus has been shared and viewed over 270 billion times online with
16 123 almost 40 million Twitter and web-based news sites mentions in the 47 countries of the WHO
17 124 African Region.(2)

18 125 The COVID-19 pandemic also led to a cosmic increase in scientific publication—including both
19 126 peer reviewed and non-peer reviewed pre-prints. While the internet and social media helped
20 127 in rapid dissemination of information on preventive measures as the science evolved, it also
21 128 produced unprecedented volumes of misinformation. Social media discussions spread
22 129 confusion around many areas including the use of masks and SARS-CoV-2 mode of
23 130 transmission.(3) The spread of misinformation on social media became an even larger issue
24 131 when prominent political leaders including some heads of governments and other ‘influencers’
25 132 used their social media accounts to question the prevailing science, as well as introduce and
26 133 support unverified treatments to the virus.(4) Prominent social media platforms took initiatives
27 134 to curb misinformation—for example, YouTube removed around 800,000 videos containing
28 135 COVID misinformation including 30,000 on vaccines.(5) However, managing information
29 136 about an unknown pathogen with pandemic potential became arguably as challenging as
30 137 managing the virus itself. By February 2nd, 2020, the global flow of information – including
31 138 factual, misinformation and disinformation – was so voluminous the WHO stated the world
32 139 was not only experiencing a pandemic, but an infodemic that made it difficult for people to find
33 140 trustworthy guidance and sources.

34 141 Accounting for the trends of local media consumption and widespread social media uptake,
35 142 several countries adopted a multi-pronged communication strategy deploying both traditional
36 143 media and new media channels to tackle COVID-19. Countries including China, Singapore,
37 144 South Korea, and Japan heavily relied on digital communication channels such as government
38 145 websites, social media, and messaging apps for communication efforts.(6) Unfortunately, the
39 146 use of these channels inadvertently led to the emergence of misinformation and

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3 147 disinformation. To tackle these issues, many countries including Brazil, Russia, Singapore,
4 148 Thailand, and Vietnam passed legislations against online misinformation in 2020, threatening
5 149 monetary fines and imprisonment. Governments were not the only entities that struggled to
6 150 tackle misinformation. Social media companies were not as prepared as they could have been
7 151 for a crisis of this magnitude. While there have been improvements, their efforts to combat
8 152 misinformation remain deficient, for example, social media companies only banned sharing
9 153 anti-vaccination information in February 2021. Moreover, "End-to-end" encrypted
10 154 applications, such as WhatsApp, which is a popular application in many LMICs, are a
11 155 significant source of misinformation, and are particularly challenging to monitor and control.
12 156 Another contextual factor that shaped the COVID-19 pandemic is the level of trust that
13 157 communities have in their institutions. A key pillar of engaging with communities is establishing
14 158 trust and maintaining effective channels of communication. In an emergency such as a
15 159 disease outbreak, trust in three types of actors is often relevant to required behavioral change:
16 160 the government which imposes the required changes and requests people's compliance,
17 161 fellow citizens whose cooperation is needed for individual efforts to be effective, and science
18 162 as the source of information arguing that these changes are needed. The role of trust was in
19 163 the spotlight during the 2014-2015 Ebola outbreak in west Africa. A large representative
20 164 survey in Liberia at the time showed that people who expressed a lack of trust in government
21 165 ignored precautions against Ebola in their homes—including hand washing, and social
22 166 distancing, and were reluctant to follow Ebola control policies like safe burial. The study found
23 167 that the lack of compliance was not due to lack of understanding of Ebola symptoms, means
24 168 of spread, or precautions, but rather because people did not trust the capacity or integrity of
25 169 the government to recommend precautions and implement policies.⁽⁷⁾ Maintaining
26 170 communities' trust during pandemics relies both on pre-pandemic efforts to build the credibility
27 171 of governments and institutions and on investment in resources as well as clarity and
28 172 transparency in communication by both international and national authorities. The pre-
29 173 existence of lack of trust in authorities is a consistent reason for inadequate community
30 174 engagement, and this is often triggered by lack of proper, understandable, and consistent
31 175 communication by authorities or political instability and violence. Several factors potentially
32 176 contributed to the erosion of trust during the pandemic.
33 177 The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated again that people who have little trust in government
34 178 and scientific leaders are more reluctant to follow public health messages, particularly
35 179 communities that are marginalized.⁽⁸⁾ For example, at the outset of 2020, a survey of 34,000
36 180 people in 28 countries showed that only 42% of participants had confidence that government
37 181 leaders could address the challenges of the day. However, trust in science, while decreasing,
38 182 continued to be at comparably high levels. By 2021, trust in governments decreased even
39 183 further.⁽⁹⁾ Two factors potentially contributed to the erosion of trust during the COVID-19

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3 184 pandemic. First, the COVID-19 pandemic presented a new and complex challenge in the need
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5 185 to communicate rapidly changing scientific understanding with increasing access to
6
7 186 information. There were early errors in communication efforts, which failed to provide a clear
8
9 187 indication that the science would evolve, and these errors later contributed to resistance to
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11 188 proposed public health interventions. Second, the geopolitical tensions with leaders of
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13 189 countries criticizing the handling of the UN, especially WHO, early communication and
14
15 190 guidance around the outbreak in China impacted the public's trust in these institutions. This
16
17 191 created challenges for international institutions in navigating the politics while communicating
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19 192 in ways that maintain credibility.

193 Ultimately, COVID-19 misinformation and trust are interconnected. The spread of
194
195 misinformation is one manifestation of deeper issues around trust in governments and
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197 institutions. Misinformation in this context translated to resistance to public health measures
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199 such as mask wearing as well as vaccine hesitancy. In a way, that was a manifestation of
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201 people's expressed desire to be informed, consulted, included, and activated in the response
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203 plans and actions.

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206 **Communication and Community engagement efforts during the COVID-19 pandemic**

207 There is ample evidence supporting the importance of sustained community engagement.
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209 Integration of good community engagement strategies into pandemic preparedness and
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211 response creates a sense of autonomy and confidence, fosters trust, facilitates an
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213 environment of sustainable behaviors, and improves compliance with precautionary
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215 measures, all of which lead to improved health outcomes.⁽¹⁰⁾ With support from the
216
217 community, governments can tailor solutions for the specific needs of the communities in
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219 general and marginalized groups in particular. The ongoing pandemic has demonstrated the
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221 need to center communities in preparedness and response efforts more than ever before,
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223 especially in a context of misinformation and eroding trust. Throughout the pandemic, many
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225 communities across the world organized to tackle both the virus as well as help those most
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227 affected by the social and economic impact of the pandemic. While many occurred organically,
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229 these efforts provide lessons that can be learned to improve communication and community
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231 engagement efforts in the future.

232 Community involvement during the pandemic ranged from passive actions to active
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234 engagement, either as per government directives or voluntarily through civil society
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236 organizations or under local community leadership. Overall, communities played a critical role
237
238 in supporting the clinical response to the pandemic, particularly through helping in
239
240 surveillance, testing, and contact tracing efforts. Communities also took on the responsibilities
241
242 of developing and distributing essential medical equipment such as masks. Finally, many

221 communities supported members in need and linked people to services that address the larger
 222 societal aspects of pandemic management (box 1). These efforts were especially useful when
 223 governments did not provide basic services or when these services were suspended due to
 224 the reallocation of resources to COVID-19 efforts.

225

226 **Box 1: Emerging themes from successful community engagement efforts during COVID-19**

227

228 **Success factors**

- 229 • Effective **mobilization** of existing community structures, resources, trusted organizations, and
 230 knowledge bases e.g.,
 - 231 ○ *local health authorities in northwest Syria adopted a decade old polio vaccination mobilization*
 232 *system of local volunteers and a medical network in Turkey to raise COVID awareness, refer*
 233 *patients, and to train health workers,*
 - 234 ○ *women self-help groups in India entrusted to run community kitchens for quarantined people,*
 - *Yemen used local women association and international agencies to train women in a rural*
district to produce masks and PPE
- **Institutionalizing** risk communication and community engagement in preparedness and response
 e.g.,
 - *Thailand had a well-designed risk communication plan with a clear command structure and*
clearly defined responsibilities; an all hazards risk communication plan; and a focused
budget, which they used to roll out a ‘stay home, stop the virus, for our nation’ campaign
across the national level and 76 provinces using the existing trusted network of Village Health
Volunteers.
 - *South Korea’s Korea Centre for Disease Control and Prevention has an Office of*
Communication that is mandated to “perform communication in the emergence of infectious
diseases”. The office acted as a single focal point of communication of all technical and
scientific information, and began sending messages on COVID-19 through multiple channels,
even before the first case was reported in the country.
- Developing **innovative** uses of technology and social media channels for engagement and
 communication e.g.,
 - *“route maps” in India for contact tracing*
 - *testing site locator mobile app in the US*
- **Promoting** cultures of civic mindedness e.g.,
 - *Japan, Taiwan, and China emphasized “consideration of others” in public health messages to*
promote mask use
- Clear, consistent, and effective **messaging** e.g.,
 - *Thailand, Vietnam, and South Korea not only prioritized the communication of information to*
their populations, but also clearly outlined methods through which community members can
manage risks within their own communities such as staying at home.

235 There are also continuous challenges to this area and the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted
236 some gaps in the current approach to communication and community engagement (box 2).

237

238 **Box 2: Inequities and human rights violations as emerging challenges to successful**
239 **RCCE during the COVID-19 pandemic**

240 There have been multiple challenges to successful RCCE efforts during the COVID-19
241 pandemic. However, two areas stand out. First, communities are not equal in their access to
242 resources, and the biggest casualties from the pandemic have been marginalized groups and
243 youths. In the United States, for example, there were no systematic efforts to engage African
244 Americans in vaccine trials—only 3% of people enrolled in COVID-19 vaccine trials were
245 African American although they represent 13 percent of the population and account for 21
246 percent of deaths due to COVID-19.(17) A key pillar of engaging with communities and with the
247 public in general is establishing trust and maintaining effective channels of communication. The
248 pandemic demonstrated that people who have little trust in government and scientific leaders
249 are more reluctant to follow public health messages, particularly communities who are
250 marginalized and have been isolated from the engagement process. The proliferation of
251 misinformation, compounded by the erosion of trust in scientific leaders led to significant
252 challenges in risk communication during the pandemic. An important constituent affected by
253 the pandemic is youth. While young people are less likely to be physically affected by the virus,
254 the COVID-19 pandemic has had a great impact on youth including interruptions in their
255 education, employment opportunities, increasing domestic violence, and strain on mental
256 health. For example, among Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
257 (OECD) countries, the low-paying jobs that were most affected by the pandemic were mainly
258 held by young people. About 35% of those aged 15-29 are employed in these jobs compared
259 to 15% among middle aged employees. Moreover, the long-term social and economic
260 consequences of the pandemic will most likely disproportionately affect young people and
261 potentially exacerbate intergenerational inequities. However, gaps remain in efforts to engage
262 young people and address their issues. (18)

263 Second, a significant challenge during the pandemic has been balancing efforts to tackle the
264 virus without decaying human rights. International human rights law permits restrictions on civil
265 liberties to protect public health so long as those restrictions are applied in certain ways.(19)
266 Without attention to these limitations, public health responses can exceed constraints under
267 human rights law, with digital surveillance and criminal law approaches to compliance raising
268 particular concerns.(20,21) Further, increasingly authoritarian governments have exploited
269 emergency laws to clamp down on civil liberties and attack political opponents.(22)

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272 Historically, both communication and community engagement are often perceived as additions
273 to response efforts during emergencies rather than core components of preparedness and
274 response. As a result, neither area typically receives adequate resources and funding in the
275 overall preparedness and response budget. Moreover, community engagement is often
276 viewed as parallel to, or even a sub-component of, risk communication effort, rather than an
277 overarching goal.

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3 271 COVID-19 was no different. On the international level, there was a clear need for more
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5 272 commitment of resources to communication and community engagement efforts. This area is
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7 273 often dependent on waves of unsustainable project-based funding that cycle in and out during
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9 274 emergencies. For example, the WHO had sustained funding for capacity building for the first
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11 275 time in 2020, and about \$1 million per year divided between headquarters and regions under
12
13 276 the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) framework. In fact, about 75% of risk
14
15 277 communication and community engagement (RCCE) and 'infodemiology' staffing at the WHO
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17 278 are on project funding. When the Collective Service was established in June 2020 to advance
18
19 279 RCCE around COVID-19, it was funded by a six-months grant by the Gates foundation, which
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21 280 was later extended for another six months. Even with these efforts, international guidance on
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23 281 RCCE mainly focused on risk communication (box 3).
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Box 3: RCCE efforts during COVID-19 pandemic at the international level

Most of the efforts during the COVID-19 pandemic focused on the risk communication. The exchange of information and coordination globally was organised by the WHO to regularly report specific epidemiological indicators as relayed by the member states, the frequency of which depended on the reporting by countries. To manage the vast flow of information on the novel virus and facilitate availability of trustworthy and timely information, the WHO also established Information Network for Epidemics (EPI-WIN)(23).

To enable governments to effectively respond to COVID-19, the WHO released guidance on risk communication in January 2020. (24) In December 2020, in collaboration with GOARN (the Global Outbreak and Alert Response Network), United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), and International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), WHO released a strategy document titled COVID 19 Global Risk Communication and Community Engagement Strategy. Between December 2020 and May 2021, global efforts aimed at ensuring people-centered and community led approaches to increase trust and social cohesion and reduce COVID-19 burden.(25)

On the national level, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, WHO joint external evaluation of the International Health Regulations (IHR) core capacities of a sample of member states highlighted limitations in how countries approached RCCE efforts as part of their preparedness efforts. In particular, indicator 5.4 ("community engagement with the effected communities") had the second lowest average score out of the 5 indicators relevant to RCCE.(11) This is consistent with the lack of systematic efforts to sustain community engagement during "peacetime" and locating community engagement as part of risk communication efforts. Such an approach, while critical to successful community engagement, limits communities' capacity to be empowered or to be active participants in pandemic preparedness and response. Further, despite increasing political and operational commitment to community engagement, funding for community engagement is often limited, supporting ad hoc reactionary interventions rather than sustained action.(12)

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3 308 These trends did not change much as the COVID-19 pandemic progressed, governments
4 309 began prioritizing RCCE efforts as part of their pandemic response. In April 2020, only about
5 310 36% of countries reported having a plan to the WHO, but that number increased to 90% by
6 311 October 2020. However, these numbers do not fully reflect the reality of RCCE efforts within
7 312 countries, as the definition of RCCE efforts vary greatly by country.(12)

8 313 In a review of the COVID-19 responses among 28 countries as part of the Independent Panel
9 314 for Pandemic Preparedness and Response, countries varied greatly in how they implemented
10 315 RCCE efforts.(13) Overall, countries lacked formal community engagement plans as part of
11 316 their response efforts, except a few countries that attempted to centre communities in their
12 317 response efforts. Pakistan for example established an RCCE taskforce to develop messages
13 318 and strategies and coordinate all related interventions. With its strength in rapid mass
14 319 mobilization, Vietnam has been touted as an exemplar of 'whole of society' approach where
15 320 the mass organizations, military, and police personnel came together to provide support for
16 321 the community, particularly those undergoing targeted lockdowns.(14)

17 322

18 323 **Lessons to improve communication and community engagement emerging from the**
19 324 **COVID-19 pandemic**

20 325 Three important lessons are emerging so far from COVID-19 pandemic around
21 326 communication and community engagement, both from the successful efforts as well as from
22 327 the challenges to official efforts by governments. These lessons are First, communities need
23 328 to be early partners in all stages of the design, planning, implementation, and assessment of
24 329 preparedness and response efforts. Community sense of ownership and involvement,
25 330 especially marginalized groups, in the design and planning of interventions is an important
26 331 factor in successful community engagement. This requires transparency from governments
27 332 and appreciation and recognition of the importance of community engagement by the
28 333 authorities. Second, community engagement is not a one-time effort. Successful community
29 334 engagement efforts have to be ongoing prior to, during, and after disease outbreaks, which
30 335 requires clear structures and sustained funding. This fosters trust in governments during times
31 336 of vulnerability and uncertainty such as seen during the COVID-19 pandemic. Third, risk
32 337 communication is necessary but insufficient on its own if it is unidirectional and not combined
33 338 with other community engagement efforts. Effective risk communication includes opening
34 339 communication channels with communities to understand their concerns and incorporate their
35 340 feedback into government communication strategies, as well as providing communities with
36 341 actionable, timely, and honest information online and offline to maintaining trust. Flow of
37 342 communication between different stakeholders during a disease outbreak is critical and if the
38 343 communication system between authorities and communities is broken, there will be confusion
39 344 among teams in the field and in the community involved. Importantly, cyclical dissemination

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3 345 of information is essential for sustained interest among communities to engage in prevention
4 and response efforts.
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8 348 **Embracing a community resilience approach in preparedness and response efforts**

9 349 A paradigm shift in communication and community engagement efforts can be realized
10 through a community resilience approach to pandemic preparedness and response efforts.
11 350

12 351 COVID-19 now provides a clear case for adopting such a community resilience approach.(15)

13 352 Community resilience refers to the ability of a community to both mitigate adverse effects and
14 recover from a disaster. Adopting a community resilience approach has been helpful for
15 353
16 addressing large disruptions, e.g., natural disasters, affecting societies.(16)
17 354

18 355 Importantly, without sustained investment in communities, any form of engagement is likely to
19 serve only as a band-aid rather than as a sustainable framework for future community
20 356
21 empowerment and recovery. The pandemic has shown the role inequities in access to
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23 resources, pre-existing health conditions, economic investment, and human rights violations,
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25 in shaping health outcomes. The pandemic also brought into focus the grave socio-economic
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27 360 inequities that fueled the pandemic in many countries and were then exacerbated by the
28 pandemic. Embracing a community resilience approach to pandemic preparedness and
29 361

30 362 response requires a paradigm shift from the traditional efforts that mainly focus on immediate
31 actions during pandemics to investment in communities prior to, during, and after
32 363

33 364 pandemics.(15) Adapting a community resilience approach to pandemic preparedness and
34 response can be achieved through developing a multi-pronged approach including effective
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36 risk communication through the ongoing provision of information on preparedness, risks, and
37 366
38 relevant resources to the public before, during, and after an outbreak. This area is increasingly
39 367

40 important in the age of social media and mass misinformation. A community resilience
41 368
42 approach also requires fostering a culture of social connectedness and investment in civic
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44 mindedness. The empowerment of individuals and communities to be part of preparedness
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46 and response is vital and will also require promoting participatory decision-making in response
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48 and recovery efforts. In addition, a community resilience approach means integration and
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50 involvement of communities in planning and leadership through strong partnerships between
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52 governments and community-based entities to co-design interventions that address the
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54 specific needs of the local community. Finally, to enable resilience, governments need
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56 investments in social and economic well-being, and in physical and psychological health.
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58 Community resilience is strongly impacted by existing levels of social protections as well as
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60 access and utilizations of health services. The COVID-19 pandemic in particular highlighted
61 378
62 the need to invest in people's mental health. Resilient communities are more prepared to
63 379

64 mitigate the adverse effects and recover from large societal disruptions such as the COVID-
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66 19 pandemic.
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