Sale of UK’s Vaccine Manufacturing and Innovation Centre

Short sightedness

However, is this really making the best use of public money? Or is it another case of what the former head of the UK Vaccine Task Force, Kate Bingham, recently described as the government’s neglect of biological threats and lack of strategic scientific expertise in decision making?

As highlighted by numerous commentators, including Bingham,6 maintaining robust vaccine research, development, and manufacturing capabilities should be a cornerstone of any national security strategy. Cultivating such a complex infrastructure requires long term funding and political backing. The development of the technologies underlying current adenovirus and mRNA vaccines took decades—and future pandemics may require different technological solutions.

Expecting industry to make the necessary long term investments is naive. The history of vaccination includes numerous examples where a mix of short term industrial priorities and lack of long term political planning compromised the ability of research, development, and manufacturing hubs to attract private and public investment, retain skilled workers, and respond to emerging and re-emerging disease threats.7 The UK experienced a substantial loss of vaccine capabilities during the 1980s and 1990s, for example, after leading players such as the Wellcome Foundation and Glaxo pulled out of or relocated centres of vaccine expertise to other countries.8

The VMIC, which was conceived before the pandemic, was a sign of renewed political ambition and confidence in the UK’s vaccine infrastructure. Situated at the intersection of public and private research and providing a vital bridging function for both, the centre offers a cost effective way to retain and adapt staff and skills to meet current and future threats. Its ability to rapidly produce enough promising products for phase II and III clinical trials without lengthy negotiations with external investors and manufacturers could greatly accelerate vaccine development in the UK and serve as a model for public infrastructure investment in other global health challenges such as antibiotic innovation.9

Worryingly, statements by the Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), which oversaw the substantial public investment in the VMIC, indicate that the UK government is distancing itself from the centre and its sale, with little explanation or transparency.110 Meanwhile, bidders—which include Oxford Biomedica, Fuji Film, and the Lonza Group—are relative unknowns in vaccine development. The loss of the VMIC at this time is arguably akin to defunding fire brigades after extinguishing a major blaze.

Economically, selling the VMIC without parallel improvements to strengthen the upstream innovation that led to much of the UK’s early covid-19 vaccination successes makes little sense. Revenues from the sale of VMIC will have little or no effect on the biggest rise in national debt since the second world war.

Reputationally and strategically, the damage may be even worse. Coming just after a U turn on a 100 million dose vaccine contract with French-Austrian company Valneva that caused production to move from Scotland to Germany, selling the VMIC signals a lack of government commitment that will deter investors who may wish to build British biomedical capacity—an important goal of post-Brexit strategic planning.111

Since the decision to sell off the VMIC during a pandemic seems difficult to justify on strategic, public health, economic, or reputational grounds, it would be foolhardy to proceed with it. The government is entertaining offers for the VMIC, but it has not yet accepted any, to our knowledge. Until it is sold, there remains an opportunity for the UK public and its elected members of parliament to convince those in charge to protect what could well become a cornerstone of British pandemic preparedness and bioindustrial infrastructure.