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I have previously commented about the issue of privacy in contact tracing and quarantine monitoring (ref 1).
As the UK wakes up to the news that their centralised home-grown contact tracing app from the NHS has been abandoned and their Government is looking at using the decentralised Apple-Google alternative (ref 2) still months away, the matter of privacy is now a tricky ideological football in which the collection of data is still location and time based (in order to determine eligibility for recall) and how much information in the operating system based alternative would be handed over upon identification of a possible contact.
Meanwhile in Beijing undergoing a possible second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, “a city official said 355,000 people had been identified for testing using 'big data' but did not say how” (ref 3).
I suspect the UK already have the technology (hardware and potentially software) in place to identify potential contact tracing candidates in most big cities using the same “big data” process. Phone tower tracking and electronic handshakes, electronic payment, oyster travel cards and other footprints can be gathered with minimum fuss.
So any consideration of privacy matters may need to be carefully considered when dealing with the same issue with the Apple-Google contact tracing alternative.
Perhaps even a matter of choosing the less bad (rather than “better”) option.