What went wrong at Addenbrooke’s?
BMJ 2015; 351 doi: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.h5278 (Published 02 October 2015) Cite this as: BMJ 2015;351:h5278All rapid responses
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I agree with the comments by Sir Mike Richards. It is unfair to criticise the inspection process (which also rated Addenbrooke's as 'Outstanding' on one measure).
There are a number of former Addenbrooke's staff who perceived at first hand the disconnect between management and staff working on the ground highlighted in the CQC report. Addenbrooke's was witness to the unfair dismissal of three Indian consultants in two years, with no attempt to seek or show respect for the views of clinical staff or patients, a refusal to have external scrutiny of whistleblowing concerns, and an insistence on dismissing staff by a process which a judge said might be thought to resemble a 'show trial' (and Sir Robert Francis described, with reference to hospital disciplinary hearings in general, as a 'kangaroo court'). The fact that Addenbrooke's never apologised for its mistakes or changed its procedures after it was found to have behaved wrongly in these three cases further points to a culture that was not in the interests of patient safety or staff well-being.
Competing interests: No competing interests
The question is could anyone else have done any better?
The suspicion is that the NHS does not want leaders, rather it wants political administrators.
The sadness is that the sort of managerialism represented by this affair will never solve the problems we face. The enabling professional approach McNeil says he expounded was more likely to stand a chance.
Competing interests: No competing interests
With 6% cuts to general practice, 14% cuts to social care, up to 25% cuts across secondary care, 7,000 hospital beds cut, 6,000 nurses cut, 550 general practices closed, 66 A+E and maternity units cut, £14bn spent on a more costly health market, 80-90% of Hospitals across the country consequently expected to end the year in debt with a total deficit of £2bn - what on earth DOES CQC expect to find with its new "tougher" inspection regime?
England is operating the most austere healthcare regulatory regime of anywhere in the world - perversely, setting up to fail one of the world's best and most desirable healthcare systems.
Is CQC happy to be seen as the blind instrument of Govt, one that ratifies the destruction of the NHS, measuring the footprints while our humane endeavours are trampled out of existence by the elephant in the room?
Competing interests: No competing interests
Whether the departed Chief of the hospital is right, or, whether the Chief Inspector of Hospitals is right, I do not know.
Addenbrooke's is just one of the hospitals to have 'failed'. As I have suggested in a previous Response, the Select Committeee on Health ought to investigate the pathogenesis of failure. Only the probing questions from MPs will elicit the facts and only then is there any hope of halting the spate of failures.
Competing interests: Live not far from Addenbrookes. May need treatment there one day though none yet envisaged.
I strongly refute the statement by Keith McNeil that CQC inspectors “came in with a preconceived idea of what they wanted to find”. We were aware before the inspection that performance and the financial position at Addenbrooke’s had declined markedly in the year prior to inspection, but we were not expecting to find safety, quality and leadership issues of sufficient severity to merit a rating of Inadequate.
Although we find that elevated mortality is generally a reliable marker of poor quality (as evidenced by the outcomes of the Keogh reviews in 2013), absence of elevated mortality is not a reliable marker of good quality. CQC has rated more than a dozen trusts as inadequate despite mortality being within normal limits.
Alongside mortality we look at the results of national clinical audits. In medical care at Cambridge, performance on the national inpatient diabetes audit and the heart attack audit (MINAP) were both below the national average. The stroke audit (SSNAP) was scored as D (on a scale of A to E). Risk assessments for venous thromboembolism were conducted in 79% of patients against a national average of 96%.
An inadequate rating means risks to safety are real and immediate. In maternity services we found serious concerns relating to the environment, equipment, lack of recording of risk assessments and substantial midwife shortages. There were continued incidents reported relating to foetal heart rate monitoring with limited evidence of changes in practice to improve safety. Early warning score assessments were not being completed. Staff raised concerns to us that the maternity record system was potentially unsafe due to a combination of electronic and paper records being in use and being used inconsistently.
We found that staffing levels in critical care fell below nationally recommended guidelines. Staff were aware of this, but initially our findings were refuted by the chief executive.
The poor ‘grip’ on flow that we observed in Cambridge and other trusts leads to more beds needing to be opened, dilution of permanent staff across more wards, patients not being cared for with the appropriate expertise, more agency staff being required and a downward financial position.
Many staff throughout the trust informed the CQC inspection team about the disconnect between ward and senior executives. This is also corroborated by the NHS staff survey results for Cambridge for 2014 in which the trust had 16 of the 28 items in the bottom 20% and none in the top 20%.
The trust has responded positively to our report and I have confidence that it will take the actions needed for improvement. If it does, I agree with the article’s optimistic note that the trust could come out of special measures within a year.
Competing interests: No competing interests
There is no possible contextual explanation which justifies why Addenbrooke's has been put into special measures by CQC, forcing the loss of its CEO and distracting focus from patient care to one of satisfying the inspectorate.
Addenbrooke's is, indisputably, one of the best hospitals in the country. So their new EPR system didn't work properly when it was rolled out; well, neither did Universal Credit, but that's hardly going to bring down Iain Duncan Smith or the Govt. A matter for condemnation by CQC, really?
Invidious subjective CQC judgements over 'disconnects' between staff and management visions, long waiting times etc are obviously a very small part of a much bigger picture: a picture which depicts Govt regulatory bodies apparently unable to recognise what doctors and the public alike rightly perceive as an excellent provider of care in a hospital.
Doesn't it seem strange to anyone that - as King's Fund repeatedly publishes calls for emergency funding for an NHS about to melt down - DoH and CQC continue to expect and demand all NHS services to continue to run to some ever-changing notion of perfection? Are they naive, incompetent, or purposefully ignoring this incontrovertible reality?
I think most people will now wonder what the Govt and CQC's purpose actually is, in trying to undermine this exemplary pillar of the NHS. Could it be that by bringing in TSA, Addenbrooke's will now be corralled into closure or privatisation? At best, it will undergo a destabilising change of leadership, an unhealthy focus on ticking the right boxes, a period of fear and uncertainty for staff and patients, and the by-now familiar institutional humiliation of the NHS by this Govt.
As the s**t hits the fan, the people truly responsible for the ongoing demolition of the NHS are making sure that the fan is pointing in the other direction - at excellent hospitals like Addenbrooke's. It is time the wind changed.
Competing interests: No competing interests
This is not the first Trust ( what a description), not the first Teaching Trust, to have gone down.
If the Parliament wants to halt the infection, its Health Select Committee ought to summon lay officers and consultants, nurses, who worked in the failures of today but successes of yester years and interrogate them.
Why did the hospitals like Addenbrookes, Whipps Cross flourish in the past? And fail today?
Competing interests: Not far from where I live. I might one day, need treatment there.
Most commentators agree that NHS hospitals are facing mounting pressures. But these don't explain the sudden emergence of problems at Addenbrooke's. And McNeil's interpretation of management grip as Stalinist control doesn't suggest he gets the explanation right either.
McNeil seems to be a believer in empowering clinical teams to raise quality and improve efficiency. This is surely a good philosophy as most sustained improvement comes from the ground up not from the top down. He contrasts this with the sort of "grip" popular with David Nicholson characterised by detailed central directives about how people should work and a stifling bureaucracy of inspection and control. He seems to think that this is the management style the CQC want to see and criticised him for lacking.
But this isn't the sort of failure of grip that caused the problems at Cambridge. Mcneil's failure was not adequately translating his vision of an eHospital into an effective implementation of the new Epic EPR. And then not recognising quickly that the implementation had a disturbing number of serious problems. We know this was obvious on the ground very quickly. A&E performance fell off a cliff the week the system went live. Many of the medical staff across the hospital were concerned that the system wasn't working properly and that nobody in a senior position wanted to admit it. And the hospital's finances deteriorated sharply as they couldn't code activity correctly so they would get paid the right amount for it. (I've written at length about the situation here: http://policyskeptic.blogspot.co.uk/2015/09/what-really-went-wrong-at-ad... )
The lack of grip that mattered was firstly a failure to translate the (pretty sensible) vision into good operational plans to make it work. Secondly it was a failure to grasp that the rollout wasn't working when this was very obvious on the ground.
There is nothing wrong with a vision of teams empowered to do the right thing or with the idea that an effective information system will help them do that. And you don't need Stalinist management to make that happen. You do need a good grip on operational reality. And it is clear that this was neither present in the implementation plan nor after the EPR system was rolled out.
Visionary plans don't work unless they are backed up by a detailed understanding of the operational reality for all the staff on each ward in each department. It is a failure to achieve this "grip" that brought down McNeil not a failure to implement a Stalinist bureaucracy.
Competing interests: No competing interests
Re: What went wrong at Addenbrooke’s?
Dear Kamran, Richard
I found the article about Addenbrookes in the 10th October issue of the BMJto be ill-informed, misleading and naive. I am left with the impression that neither of you have actually read the CQC report, many conclusions of which are based on what our own hospital staff told the inspectors.
The report highlights repeatedly the significant failures in our systems and processes (including the electronic hospital IT set-up) as well as ineffectual leadership at the very top and divisional levels. It also
stresses the disconnect between senior management and front line healthcare professionals, not only in terms of whether we are a DGH or teaching Hospital (the divide is artificial and foolish), but reflecting how out of touch the Trust hierarchy were because they did not listen to their staff's concerns.
The departed CEO was ultimately responsible for the local strategic blunders. He supposedly "resigned" but has not yet, and probably never will be, held accountable for what happened simply because that is the prevalent NHS culture. Alas, his "grip" on how to run a hospital such as Addenbrooke's was non-existent and we have suffered greatly as a result. Agreed that the CQC inspection processes are not geared to appreciating the true value of a major teaching hospital and a whole host of external factors have also contributed to our current circumstances. This should not detract, however, from the fact that a significant number of the problems we face today are of our own making..
Our "clinical outcomes" are very good despite all the above but they could be even better and are of course only one barometer of clinical excellence and patient care. As an institution, we are determined to get through this difficult phase because we have some of the best staff in the NHS, dedicated to making Addenbrooke's truly world-class. The consultants in particular need to stand up and take a lead by engaging more with senior management decisions and facilitating culture change.. Our professional responsibilities extend way beyond the boundaries of our wards and clinics and never before has it been so important to realise this.
Next time you cover the story of a particular hospital, please make sure you have the full picture rather than simply support the viewpoint of a former employee.
--
Dr Fraz A. Mir
Consultant Physician / Staff Governor
Box 275, EAU Level 3
Cambridge University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
Addenbrooke's Hospital
Hills Road
Cambridge CB2 0QQ
United Kingdom
Competing interests: No competing interests