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It is one thing to warn of dangers, but why not offer a solution? Denying access to the vast majority of patients in case of possible unproven harm to others would be the type of logic that would leave us scavenging in the jungle ('best not use fire - it could be dangerous'). Too often a red flag is waved simply as a way of trying to block progress. There are dangers, but can we find ways to have most of the benefits without too many dangers?
How could we identify those who are 'vulnerable'? Would it depend on a doctor deciding the patient is vulnerable or is this something we could dare let patients decide for themselves? What classification of vulnerability applies here? Would we have to vet all the patient's family and friends to ensure they would not 'exploit' the patient's access to their own record?
There is already the right to have a copy of ones medical record under the DPA 1998, so anyone likely to exploit a patient's vulnerability can just coerce them into requesting a copy of their records at present - no online registration and access required - and one gets the full record! Is there any evidence that 'vulnerable' patients have been exploited in this way?
I think we need a clearer argument against patient access before we accept this supposed 'danger'. Currently, it just smacks of scare-mongering.