The hardest thing: admitting error
BMJ 2012; 344 doi: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.e3085 (Published 02 May 2012) Cite this as: BMJ 2012;344:e3085All rapid responses
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I was inspired by Daniel Sokol’s unequivocal tone and compassion in describing patients who have been denied the truth after suffering harm from medical error.
How uninspiring, then, to see that the only doctors replying to the article are preoccupied with chastising him for a lack of empathy towards the medical profession. The implication of Nassrally’s reference to these situations as “dilemmas” is that, although he supports the principle of disclosure, he accepts that other doctors may still regard themselves as legitimate arbiters. Vetrugno’s notion that consequences for cost of litigation should have an overriding bearing, is frankly disturbing.
Certain principles in medicine are so fundamental and sacred that it is grotesque to seek to temper them. Surely the right of a patient to be informed about an error that has caused them harm, is one of these? I interpret Sokol’s unequivocal stance as a reflection of this. I am grateful for his clarity of expression.
Competing interests: No competing interests
With some tenuous and inconclusive evidence, Sokol[1] attempts to suggest that ‘closing ranks’ in the medical profession is pervasive problem and a major hindrance to lawful compensation. A hospital’s decision to “not admit liability”[1] when the real reason had been candidly admitted by doctors (in “a peer reviewed journal”[1] too), is surely not a good example of closing of the ranks; this suggests, the legal defences advanced by the hospital had delayed the compensation process rather than any misdeed by the doctors concerned. Further, selective remarks of “38 preregistration”[1] doctors cannot be compelling evidence to conclude that UK’s doctors tend to undermine the rights of wronged patients.
In a most recent case where a serious skull facture happened during a caesarean section, despite conceding that the injuries were caused during the course of disimpaction of the baby’s head, the defending counsel for the hospital argued (para.33): “injuries in the circumstances of this case did not amount to evidence of negligence, or at least sufficient evidence to make a finding of negligence. He submitted that the relevant literature and advice from national obstetric institutions showed that there is a well-recognised risk of such injuries in such circumstances, the approach of Dr Gupta was entirely appropriate, and the conclusion that she used unreasonable force in performing the manoeuvre cannot be drawn.”[2]. Isn’t this another example that financial compensation is not controlled or delayed by doctors who commit errors but by another process?
Whilst all doctors have a duty to be honest, it is a fact that the outcome of a negligence claim depends on its legal merits which are assessed by lawyers, and if not settled, eventually by a Court. In an era when ever increasing measures are in place to minimise the adverse effects of medical error, has Sokol[1] missed an opportunity to address the actual causes that delay remedies for wronged patients without disproportionately berating doctors?
References
[1] BMJ 2012;344:e3085
Competing interests: No competing interests
I wonder whether the direct pecuniary interest Mr Sokol as a barrister might have in saying that it is an ethical responsibility of doctors to advise patients to seek legal advice might be a conflict of interest that should have been declared? Does an ethicist have an ethical responsibility to declare interests, is there an ethicist's ethicist Mr Sokol could have sought advice from?
Competing interests: No competing interests
The assistant professor from Rome's response to Daniel Sokol's article is depressing but is also a reminder of the size of the task in front of those of us who seek an open and fair culture in healthcare. In theory at least, it is a professional requirement for doctors in the UK (and most parts of the world) to own up to errors which harm patients. A doctor who is prepared to cover up such errors lacks basic ethics and is not fit to be a doctor. It is as simple as that. However, we all know that cover ups still happen (albeit less now than in the past) and the culture in the profession is still such that some will openly seek to justify non-disclosure. Regulators, including our GMC, are inconsistent in enforcing their own codes. In order to generate a much needed acceleration in changing this culture, society and healthcare systems should demonstrate how vital a requirement open disclosure is (not just by doctors, but healthcare managers and institutions) by introducing strong, statutory requirements and enforcing them.
Competing interests: No competing interests
Giuseppe Vetrugno and Fabio De-Giorgio
Giuseppe Vetrugno, Medical Directorate, Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Rome, Italy
Fabio De-Giorgio, Institute of Legal Medicine, Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Rome, Italy
When reading D.K. Sokol’s (1) article, somehow one feels like falling into McTwisp’s burrow and emerging in Wonderland just in time to watch the delirious dance of the Mad Hatter after the slaying of the Jabberwock and the capture of the Red Queen (2).
Do you really want us to believe that, in these days where the medical profession is often the target of multi-million litigation claims, if we were to discuss our errors with a patient, he/she would be more inclined to justify our actions?
Yes, it is true, scientific publications are full of articles that talk about complications, adverse or anyway unintended effects of medical treatments. In the end, these are “errors”. However, their disclosure to the scientific community has the aim to encourage the advancement of knowledge, which is based also on the opportunity to learn from one’s own and other’s errors.
In other fields, instead, the need for maximum transparency seems to serve very different purposes. We are pressingly invited to sacrifice the right to a defense of the author of the “error” (the doctor) in the name of the sacred right of protection of the “victim” (the damaged patient), who seems entitled to everything. And so, while a common citizen may abstain from self-accusation even in front of a judge, in the case of a doctor citizen the same behavior is deemed as indecorous.
Where is the balance?
Swiss RE data show that in 2002, in the United States alone, the average medical liability indemnity payment to a claimant had been $ 1 million (3). And, in this scenario dominated by the Red Queen and by the dreaded Jabberwock, here bursts in the liberating proposal of Prof. Sokol, who plays the part of the next Alice in Wonderland: when we make an error, let’s tell everybody we have made an error.
Wonderful: a true godsend for those who will seek compensation from the insurance company that covers us and that, from that moment on, will decide to drop our coverage or to continue to cover us only if we will pay increasingly unsustainable premiums.
The case of a patient who sustained damage to her eye is reported (4) and the authors imply that the outcome would have been “dramatically” different had the case been managed differently in terms of communication.
Because ultimately this would be the magic word: communication.
The question is: can communication be the cure-all?
Indeed, the literature contains examples of failures of this kind of approach, albeit pursued for other purposes. We will just recall the experience of Roizen MF et al. (5), for whom “some patient will benefit from more and other from less detailed information”. On the other hand, the findings of the studies that focus on people’s desire to be informed or not are contradictory and provide no clear conclusion (6): therefore, a communication strategy based on transparency cannot be the solution to the problem.
Hence, we need to use other “magic words” that, when spoken one after the other, would have indeed a much more powerful effect in this situation than “Abracadabra”: “No-Fault Legislation or Compensation” (7).
It is a direct compensation system of medical iatrogenic damage where victims need not prove fault to receive compensation: the patient is quickly compensated and the doctor, liberated from the threat of a lawsuit, will feel freer to admit his/her mistakes.
It is no coincidence that most of the scientific contributions on this topic come from authors who are from countries where the “non-fault” system had been in place for a long time (New Zealand, Australia, Sweden, Norway, Denmark).
To err is human. Apparently, there is nothing magical in errors. Yet, because of an error, a remote ancestor of ours came down from the tree and, since then, many other “errors” have followed. This is the magic of errors, because by erring (which comes from the Latin verb “errare”, i.e. to wander - and wandering is the way we discover the world) we can make progress and move forward.
To criminalize errors or to pillory them in front of the patients (which is the same thing) in the context of doctor-client dynamics that have become distorted to such an extent means to take the magic out from the errors, that same magic that allowed us to get where we are today.
Instead, steering medical error toward the path of social acceptance, also through the adoption of automatic compensation systems, may be the first step towards doctors disclosing errors not under the fear of what their patients could claim, but instead driven by the desire to take another step toward the future together with them.
References
1. Sokol DK. The hardest thing: admitting error. BMJ 2012;344:e3085.
2. Carrol L. Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, 1865 and Through the Looking-Glass, and What Alice Found There, 1871.
3. http://www.swissre.com.
4. Wright J, Oppermans G. The disclosure of medical errors: a catalyst for litigation or the way forward for better patient management Wright J, Oppermans G. The disclosure of medical errors: a catalyst for litigation or the way forward for better patient management? AvMA Medical & Legal Journal 2008;15:193-6.
5. Roizen MF, Klock PA, Klafta J. How much do they really want to know? Preoperative patient interviews and the anesthesiologist. Anesth Analg. 1996 Mar;82(3):443-4.
6. Kain ZN, Wang SM, Caramico LA, Hofstadter M, Mayes LC. Parental desire for perioperative information and informed consent: a two-phase study. Anesth Analg. 1997 Feb;84(2):299-306.
7. Gaine W.J. No-fault compensation systems. BMJ 2003;326:997-998.
Competing interests: No competing interests
An equally hard thing: supporting the admission of error
Daniel Sokol’s column on disclosing medical error rightly highlights the difficulty in making such an admission1. However, his tone and condescension is unhelpful. What would be more constructive, in addition to the recognition that such an admission is required, is support for those individuals having the unfortunate task of facing such a dilemma.
The aim of a clinician is to relieve suffering and improve the lives of their patients; not to worsen their patient’s predicament. And it is likely that it has taken years of hard work and sacrifice for that healthcare provider to be in a position to help those whom they set out to help. Thus such an admission of error can have intense emotional and financial consequences – not just “trite” professional consequences. These thoughts must weigh heavily on doctors whose colleagues have made error. Doctors whilst showing empathy for their patients, can also identify with their colleagues, and may easily see themselves not only in a patient’s shoes, but a colleague’s shoes.
Waterman et al (2007) found that many physicians suffered from significant emotional distress following medical error2. They are not unemotional automatons that continue working with no compunction. Therefore whilst I support the principle of admitting to medical error and recognising others’ errors, I suggest a more supportive strategy might facilitate the achievement of this goal, rather than solely a condemnatory self-righteous stance.
1. Sokol D.K. The hardest thing: admitting error. BMJ 2012; 344:e3085
2. Waterman A.D., Garbutt J., Hazel E., Dunagan W.C., Levinson W., Fraser V.J. and Gallagher V.J. The emotional impact of medical errors on practicing physicians in the United States and Canada. Joint Commission Journal on Quality and Patient Safety 2007; 33: 467–76.
Competing interests: No competing interests
Re: The hardest thing: admitting error
There are errors and errors. There is the all too humanly understandable making of a mistake, there is negligence, another word for which is carelessness, and there is outright wrongdoing with intent. There are shades in between, round the sides and mixtures in various proportions. A patient ends up harmed. Not having a full explanation and appropriate reparation (which minimally is being apprised of the facts) compounds that harm. That’s basic human decency. All human beings, a fortiori all practitioners in whatever field, are required to behave decently. The force of that requirement is moral, which only means it often can’t be enforced in any way (people can’t be made not to make mistakes and they can’t be made to make amends) but doesn’t mean a person hasn’t done the wrong they have done.
In what other sphere would anyone even consider not setting the record straight with someone whom they had harmed? The consequences for patients of iatrogenic harm of whatever severity are lifelong. For they suffer not just the harm but the fact that it was caused by those whom they trusted to avoid it. Practitioners’ failure to face the music adds insult to injury. No conscientious practitioner who had caused harm to a patient or client could want anything other than to get right with that person. Obstacles exist to doing that. Let not the obstacle be practitioners’ unwillingness to face facts and take responsibility for what they have done. But by all means make it possible to get to the truth, and dare I hope even to optimal resolution, whatever it is, in ways which are conciliatory rather than punitive, aimed at justice, and restitution wherever possible, keeping in mind that lots of us make mistakes, some of us do really nasty things, and the object is to get it right.
miriam.pryke@kcl.ac.uk
Competing interests: Diagnosed with cancer through screening, about the implications of which clients are misled.