For healthcare professionals only

Letters Genetics and insurance

Effect on premiums is small

BMJ 2007; 334 doi: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.39247.696238.3A (Published 21 June 2007) Cite this as: BMJ 2007;334:1288
  1. R Guy Thomas, honorary lecturer
  1. Institute of Mathematics, Statistics and Actuarial Science, University of Kent, Canterbury CT2 7NF

    Neither Holm nor Ashcroft addresses the quantitative question: how much difference would genetic information make to insurance prices?1 2 Would banning insurers from access to genetic tests raise prices by 0.01% or 1% or 100%?

    The answer is that it probably makes very little difference indeed. Certainly all estimates of the difference to date, under a variety of approaches and assumptions, have been negligible by comparison with the variations in insurance prices which exist for many other reasons.

    To the very minor extent that prices do rise as a result of restricting insurers' access to genetic tests, this may not be a bad thing. In a competitive market, the logical corollary of an increase in insurance prices is an equivalent increase in claim payouts.

    The effect of a ban—if there is any measurable effect, which is highly doubtful—is a small redistribution towards people who are affected by actuarially relevant genetic predispositions.3 4

    Footnotes

    • r.g.thomas{at}kent.ac.uk

    • Competing interests: None declared.

    References

    View Abstract

    Log in

    Log in through your institution

    Subscribe

    * For online subscription