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Naomi Fulop Health Services Research Unit, London School of
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London WC1E 7HT Correspondence to: N Fulop naomi.fulop{at}lshtm.ac.uk
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Abstract |
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Objective:
To study the processes involved in and
impact of mergers between NHS trusts, including the effect on
management costs.
Design:
Cross sectional study involving in depth
interviews and documentary analysis; case study to compare savings in
management costs between case trusts and control trusts.
Setting:
Nine trusts (cross sectional study) and four trusts (case study) in London.
Participants:
96 interviews with trust board members,
other senior managers, clinicians, service managers, and
representatives of health authorities, regional office, community
health councils, local authorities, other trusts in the area, and
primary care groups and trusts.
Main outcome measures:
Stated and unstated drivers,
and impact of merger on delivery and development of services,
management structures, and staff recruitment, retention, and morale.
Effects of difference in trust size before and after the merger.
Savings in management costs two years after merger.
Results:
Some important drivers for merger are not publicly stated. Mergers had a negative effect on delivery of services
because of a loss of managerial focus on services. Planned developments
in services were delayed by at least 18 months. Trusts' larger sizes
after mergers had unintended negative consequences, as well as
predicted advantages. The tendency for one trust's management team to
dominate over the other resulted in tension. No improvement in
recruitment or retention of clinical and managerial staff was reported.
Perceived differences in organisational culture were an important
barrier to bringing together two or more organisations. Two years after
merger, merged trusts had not achieved the objective of saving
£500 000 a year in management costs.
Conclusions:
Important unintended consequences need
to be accounted for when mergers are planned. Mergers can cause
considerable disruptions to services, and require greater management
support than previously acknowledged. Other organisations undergoing
restructuring, such as primary care groups developing into primary care
trusts and health authorities merging into strategic health
authorities, should take these findings into account.
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What is already known on this topic
Little empirical research has looked at the impact of mergers; most studies focus on financial variables Mergers result in short term disruption caused by difficulties in integrating services and personnel What this study adds
Mergers have positive effects, as well as unintended negative consequences that disrupt services and set back developments in services Perceived differences in organisational culture impede bringing organisations together Mergers do not achieve target savings in management costs in first two years after merger |
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Introduction |
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Many mergers and reconfigurations of NHS trusts have taken place
in recent years. Since 1997, 99 mergers of trusts have taken place;
14 in London (Department of Health, personal communication, 2001).
These include horizontal mergers of acute hospitals, mental health
trusts, and community health services trusts. More recently, primary
care groups have merged to create primary care trusts.1 Reconfigurations have often been contentious politically
they even
provided the focus in one constituency during the general election of
2001.2 This led to the establishment of the independent reconfiguration panel, which aims to adjudicate on proposals about mergers and reconfigurations to "take the politics out" of such decisions.3
There is a range of drivers for trust mergers. One aim is to achieve economic gains: firstly, by taking advantage of economies of scale and scope (especially with regard to management costs),4 and secondly, as a result of rationalising the provision of services by reducing excess capacity to treat patients.4 Some people assume that clinical quality improves as usage of specialised units increases,5-7 quality of medical training increases,8 and staff recruitment and staff retention become more effective.9
Political drivers for mergers include facilitating hospital or service closures, securing financial viability of smaller organisations, and (on the part of providers) ensuring increased negotiating power and a survival strategy by pooling resources and enlarging the organisation in response to challenges from purchasers of services.10 For mental health services, the belief that mental health trusts with a single focus can provide higher quality services has provided additional impetus for mergers. 11 12
Sceptics of mergers argue that the evidence for benefits of horizontal mergers is patchy, contradictory, and often based on managers' beliefs about the benefits. 4 10 Unintended consequences and potential drawbacks of mergers receive less attention. These include disruption of services as a direct consequence of mergers, diseconomies of scale, and problems with staffing, service integration, systems integration, and working practices, as well as issues of equity and access to services. 4 10 13
We studied the processes involved in and impact of trust mergers. We
performed a cross sectional study of the drivers and objectives of
trust mergers, a management cost analysis, and an in depth,
longitudinal, qualitative case study of four recent mergers in London.
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Methods |
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We studied the process of merger in a cross sectional study of all nine trust mergers and reconfigurations in London which became established in April 1998 and April 1999. These involved the dissolution of 25 constituent trusts and the creation of 11 newly merged trusts. We also conducted in depth, longitudinal case studies of four of these mergers, established in April 1999.
Cross sectional study
The cross sectional study comprised an analysis of the public
consultation documents for the nine proposed trust mergers and semi
structured interviews with 14 managers in seven health authorities
associated with the trusts. One future health authority refused to
participate in the study. We aimed to identify the "stated" and
"unstated" (not publicly stated) objectives of each merger.
Case study
In the case study, we studied one merger involving acute care
trusts, one involving mental health trusts, and two involving community
NHS trusts over a two year period in the second and third years after
merger. These particular mergers were chosen to reflect the range of
trust types and geographical areas.14 The case study aimed
to explore the process of merger in depth, to assess how well the
mergers' objectives had been met, and to determine the intended and
unintended consequences of the mergers.
We report our findings from the first round of data collection, which took place in the second year after merger. During this stage, we interviewed a range of stakeholders from inside and outside the trusts. We interviewed 22-26 people per case (96 interviews in total). A core group of informants was interviewed in every case. From inside the trust, this included at least six board members. From outside the trust, this included
Other informants were found through a snowballing technique (this entails identifying initial interviewees, who go on to recommend other people for interview).15 We asked interviewees about the drivers for merger, the processes involved in the merger, and their assessment of the merger's impact on a range of issues related to service delivery, including objectives set before the merger.
Five members of the project team independently read the interview reports to ensure the analysis was reliable. We analysed data by creating a preliminary framework based on the theory behind the study and by organising responses around other themes that emerged from the data. 16 17 The project team discussed emergent themes and agreed on those to be included.
Savings in management costs for the four trusts in the case study were
estimated by comparing the actual costs (as reported in audited annual
accounts for the first two years after the merger) with an estimate of
the costs if no merger had taken place. A control group of eight trusts
not involved in a merger or major reconfiguration (any change in income
>20% in successive years) since 1995-6 was used to predict the costs
if no merger had taken place. We treated 1997-8 as the base year, and
we predicted management costs and income for the eight unmerged
constituent trusts for 1999-2000 and 2000-1 on the basis of the control
trusts' costs and income (as reported in their audited financial
accounts). We used a sensitivity analysis to test the effect of
different assumptions on the relation between income and management
costs. The post-merger trusts used in the case study did not simply
amalgamate the services of their constituent trusts
substantial
increases and decreases in income associated with changes in provided
services were seen. We adjusted the estimated savings in costs in
1999-2000 and 2000-1 to account for differences between actual and
predicted incomes by using the different levels of variable costs
produced by the sensitivity analysis.
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Results |
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Stated and unstated drivers
Stated drivers (from public consultation documents) gave the
official view of the background to and reasons for the merger, as well
as the favoured organisational structure. These included a need to make
internal savings in management costs and invest savings into
services for patients, to safeguard specialist units and guarantee
developments in services, to ensure that quality and amount of services
provided were maintained in the light of external policy drivers that
put additional pressures on services, eg Turnberg report,8
and to improve conditions and career prospects for staff and solve
recruitment and staff retention problems. For acute trusts, there was a
need to respond to various service and policy reviews that recommend
concentration of some acute and specialist services. Community and
mental health trusts were responding to beliefs that trusts'
cooperation with local authorities would be better if coterminosity was
achieved (that is, that the new trusts would cover the same
geographical area as the local authority). Community trust mergers
aimed to support development of primary care.
Unstated drivers were concerned with specific local issues about
one or more of the constituent trusts and were as reported by key
stakeholders during interviews. These included a need to impose new
management regimes on trusts perceived by health authorities or
regional office as "undermanaged" or "lacking control," to negotiate reductions in accumulated deficits of one of the constituent trusts (because new organisations could not be expected to carry the
burden of deficit from the start), and to respond to lobbying from
stakeholders
including central government, influential institutions, and pressure groups
on behalf of one or more constituent trusts. "The organisational merger was mixed up with the future of the [trust's] site, although this went through a separate consultation process . . . subsequently, there was a lot of
negotiation around the conditions of the merger" (health authority
interviewee involved in an acute trust merger).
Impact of merger on service delivery
The results from all four cases showed that the mergers had a
negative effect on the delivery and development of services (box 1).
Interviewees from inside and outside the trusts reported that the loss
of managerial focus on services during the merger had some detrimental
effects on patient care. Service developments were delayed by at least
18 months, and senior management had underestimated the timescale and
effort involved in the mergers. Some positive effects of mergers on
service developments were reported; these related, for example, to the
fact that there would be more clinicians in smaller services to run
them effectively (box 1).
Trust size
does it matter?
A range of advantages and disadvantages of large trust sizes was
reported. Although the advantages were mostly stated objectives of the
merger, the disadvantages were unintended consequences.
The benefits of larger organisations created by mergers include the
presence of a larger pool of professional staff; this enables
organisations to develop large teams of specialists, which allow
clinical excellence to be achieved. Previously fragmented specialist
services become unified and enhanced
for example, the child and
adolescent mental health services in mental health trusts. Community trust managers thought local authorities paid more attention when trusts became larger. In the mental health trust, the increased size was thought to facilitate cross fertilisation of ideas. Increased opportunities for staff training were an immediate and tangible benefit, and professional networks were enhanced by the increase in the
number of professionals.
The drawbacks included the fact that staff felt that senior managers
had become remote, and service managers felt cut off from the services
that they were managing. Staff in the acute trust felt that senior
managers did not devote enough time to them and that their needs for
help from the managers were ignored. Respondents originating from
smaller trusts felt a loss of the informality and familiarity of the
previous organisations and a decrease in the autonomy of services
and local decision making. Large trusts were seen as unresponsive and
slow to make decisions. External stakeholders were concerned about the
ability of large trusts to oversee continued quality of services and
patient care. Agencies used to having direct access to senior
management had to deal mainly with middle management
this compromised
strategic developments in some areas of service. The larger
geographical area covered by the merged trusts increased travelling
time between sites for managers. Internal communication was negatively
affected
processes of communication were viewed as incoherent and slow
in merged trusts
Management structures
Changes in the trusts' management structures created tensions
within staff groups and between clinical staff and management. Although
the competition for management posts followed NHS guidelines, the
new senior management team tended to consist predominantly of staff
from one of the constituent trusts; this created the impression of a
"takeover" for many staff (box 2). On the positive side, mergers
provided individual staff and services with an opportunity to emerge
from the constraints of previously stagnating services and management
organisations.
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Staff recruitment, retention, and morale
Findings to date have not revealed a substantial improvement in
staff recruitment or retention during the early stages of mergers,
despite this being a prominent stated driver. Benefits to staff of
mergers included improved systems of clinical supervision, more
coherent professional management, and the advantages of programmes of
appraisals, training, and career development that have been
implemented. Clinical and managerial staff, however, emphasised the
stress caused by the perceived imposed uncertainties and changes and
the increase in workload associated with the process of merger.
Organisational culture
Respondents used the term "culture" to highlight the
differences between the organisations and to explain conflicts of
values and priorities. Differences in culture related to attitudes to
innovation and risk taking
an outcome or process orientation
and patterns of communication (box 2).
Financial issues and management cost analysis
Interviews with finance managers indicated that the clearest
source of potential savings from the merger was the
£500 000-£750 000 that was associated with reduced numbers of
members of management boards in the merged trusts. Finance managers
were less convinced that other savings were achieved within the first
financial year, and they had no clear evidence that savings were
reinvested into services. Instead, they thought the mergers highlighted
hidden financial problems in the constituent trusts and revealed
differences in funding and staffing of services across the merged organisations.
Our cost analysis indicates that reductions in management costs after the mergers were less than the estimated target savings of £500 000 a year. Regression analysis of the results from all 49 London trusts in 1997-8 (excluding teaching hospitals and single speciality trusts) indicated a strong linear relation, with the variable element of management costs estimated at 4.9% (95% confidence interval 4.5% to 5.4%) of income. On the basis of the actual variable costs in the control trusts, average management cost savings were calculated as £178 700 (-£20 300 to £377 800) in the first year after merger and £346 800 (£5300 to £688 200) in the second (see table). The savings were not consistent between the trusts in the case studies, and they were sensitive to changes in the variable cost assumptions used in the sensitivity analysis.
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Discussion |
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The formation of large organisations through mergers had benefits
and drawbacks. Benefits were mostly stated objectives of the mergers,
but drawbacks arose during the process of merger and were not
considered when the decision on whether to merge was made. When mergers
go ahead, drawbacks
such as reduced accessibility for external
stakeholders
need to be resolved by the people implementing the merger.
Some research has investigated whether mergers should take place (in terms of the optimal size of hospitals).18 Much less research has investigated what happens after hospitals have merged,4 and even less has looked at the consequences of merging organisations that provide mental health or community health services. Argyris and Schon differentiated between an organisation's "espoused theory," which tends to be explicit, and an organisation's "theory in use" (actual pattern of activity), which tends to be tacit.19 They argued that low congruence between the two largely accounts for the organisation's identity.
We analysed two types of drivers for mergers: "stated" drivers
as
set out in the formal consultation documents ("espoused theory")
and "unstated" drivers
revealed through interviews
with trust and health authority staff ("theories in use"). Both
types of drivers are important to understand, as they provide the
context for the merger process
particularly where "unstated"
drivers conflict with "stated" drivers (which may leave the
organisation unclear about its objectives). The "unstated"
objectives highlight the political context within which mergers take
place. Whether the independent reconfiguration panel will be able to
"take the politics out of" these decisions remains to be seen.
Restructuring
For all four cases, the merger brought about a period of
organisational restructuring and intensive introspection that set them
back in terms of developments in the organisation and services by at
least 18 months. The amount of time needed for restructuring was
underestimated by the people who initiated the mergers and by those
who implemented them. Such delays are important unintended consequences
of mergers that must be taken into account in future plans for
reorganisation.13
Cultural differences
Differences in cultures between merging organisations seem to be
an important barrier to bringing organisations together through a
merger. Particular aspects of organisational culture cited in our
study
such as attitudes to innovation and risk taking and whether an
organisation has more of an outcomes or process orientation, and
patterns of communication
are highlighted as keys to the future
direction of health services.20
Trust size
Larger organisations were expected to be able to provide better
opportunities and facilities for staff, and this was expected to solve
problems with recruiting and retaining staff. Our study shows that the
merger had no positive impact on the recruitment and retention of
clinical staff. In some cases, the mergers exacerbated the problems of
recruiting and keeping managerial staff; they often left to avoid
organisational disruption.
Management costs
Average savings in management costs of £178 700 in the first
year and £346 800 in the second year after merger did not meet the
clearly stated objective of reducing management costs by £500 000 a
year. These numbers should be treated with caution because of the small
sample size and sensitivity of the analysis to assumptions about the
relation between management costs and income, but our data support
predictions that reductions in management costs after mergers would be
small.21 The smaller calculated savings can be explained
in part by the use of a control group of trusts in the analysis.
Between 1997-8 and 2000-1, management costs in the control trusts
increased by 3.6% and income increased by 26.7%. We adjusted the
estimated savings for the trusts used in the case studies to account
for this general decline in management costs (as a proportion of
income) reported by trusts not involved in mergers.
The low savings in management costs achieved, particularly in the first year after the merger, suggest that the implementation of mergers needed more management support than had been anticipated. Merged organisations thus need to set realistic objectives in terms of savings in management costs by taking into account the amount of managerial input needed to implement the merger. The possibility of cost savings and changes in efficiency in areas other than management costs was not explored, because this was not a stated objective of the mergers and because comparative cost data for all of the different types of trusts included in the analysis are lacking.
Timing of study
We analysed the drivers and consequences of merging healthcare
organisations for the two years after merger. Our study was
commissioned after the mergers had formally taken place. Ideally,
research on mergers and reconfigurations should begin before the
mergers take place. This would be very challenging to achieve in
practice, however, as it could be argued that the process of merger
begins as soon as discussions about merger begin. Findings presented in
this paper are "interim," in the sense that they provide a picture
of the impact of mergers at a relatively early stage in the life of the
new organisation. Other studies in the United States and the United
Kingdom showed that the results of mergers are disappointing and that
it takes a long time for positive results to
show.
13 21 22
Our study may have been performed too soon
after mergers to judge whether or not they met their objectives, given
the length of time taken to achieve considerable change in healthcare
organisations. The results from the second stage of our data collection
for the case study, which took place during the organisations' third
year of operation (data are currently being analysed), may show that
the merged trusts are closer to meeting the mergers' objectives. The
longer the timeframe used, however, the more difficult it is to
attribute effects
for example, the impact on service developments
to
the merger process, given the context of a turbulent environment of change within the NHS.
Conclusions
It is important to understand the unintended consequences of
merger and to set realistic objectives for these reorganisations. Our
findings have implications for other NHS organisations that are
experiencing reorganisation
such as the development of primary care
groups into primary care trusts and the merger of health authorities
into strategic health authorities.23
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Acknowledgments |
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We thank the staff of the NHS and allied organisations that took part in this study and Trevor Sheldon for his comments on a previous version of this paper.
Contributors: NJF, AK, PA, and CN developed the protocol and together with AH obtained funding for the study. GP, AK, RW, NJF, AH, and CN conducted the interviews for the cross sectional study and the case study. GP and AK analysed the consultation documents. AK, GP, NJF, PA, and RW read the interview reports and agreed on the themes to be analysed. GP and AK conducted the full analysis of the interview data. AH and CN developed the method for analysing the management cost data. AH conducted the analysis. NJF, GP, and AH wrote the paper. PA, AK, CN, and RW commented on drafts of the paper. NJF is guarantor.
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Footnotes |
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Funding: NHS Executive London Region's organisation and management research and development programme.
Competing interests: None declared.
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(Accepted 28 February 2002)
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