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People increasingly understand that if they don't die
of heart disease or cancer then brain failure is going to get them (p 1465). Neurological and psychiatric disorders account for only 1.4% of
deaths but 28% of years lived with a disability (p 1469). As
populations age the burden of illness caused by neurodegenerative illness will increase. That's one reason why we have devoted this issue to neurodegenerative disease (and our sister journal
Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry is doing
the same with its June issue), but another is that it's a fascinating
subject that raises fundamental questions.
Defining neurodegenerative diseases is difficult, but the "core
members" are the dementias, Parkinson's disease, motor neurone disease, cerebellar degenerations, Huntington's disease, and prion disease (p 1465). But should more "psychiatric" diseases be
included? Mary Baker, Rajendra Kale, and Mathew Menken, the editors of
this issue, mount a powerful argument for ending the division between neurology and psychiatry Science may bring together the ragbag of conditions called
neurodegenerative diseases. Lawrence Golbe describes how all seem to be
characterised by the aggregation of intracellular proteins caused by
abnormalities in protein folding (p 1467). Understanding these
abnormalities may bring new methods of treatment and prevention as well
as a more rational classification of disease.
One of the questions raised by this issue is how doctors and
patients can have very different perspectives. Mary Baker, a former
chief executive of the Parkinson's Disease Association, observes
tongue in cheek that for doctors Parkinson's disease is all above the
waist while for patients its mostly below the waist. Doctors think
about basal ganglia. Patients worry about continence, sexual function,
and whether they can walk. An editorial she writes with Leslie Findley
describes how doctors think that the condition of a patient with
Parkinson's disease will be determined by severity of disease and
adequacy of drug treatments (p 1466). In fact less than a fifth of
variation of quality of life is accounted for by these two factors.
Mood accounted for 40%, and the quality of communication with
healthcare workers another large chunk.
But should the "unravelling of memory and mind" necessarily be
regarded as a disease? Andrew Moscrop reviews a book that argues that
dementia is emphatically human and brings a dramatic involvement in the
present (p 1528). Defining it as a disease at the beginning of the 20th
century reduced the condition to "a plain horror, an utterly inhuman circumstance."
a division that appeared only in the 20th
century (p 1468). As our understanding of the brain grows, an
increasing number of mental illnesses are shown to have a biological basis
and more and more mental activities can be seen with
increasingly sophisticated imaging (p 1529).
Footnotes
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