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Michael Rigby a Centre for Health Planning and Management,
Keele University, Keele ST5 5BG, b Medical Informatics Research Centre in Turku,
University of Turku, FIN-20520 Turku, Finland, c School of Postgraduate Studies in Medical
and Health Care, University of Wales Swansea, Swansea SA2 8PP, d Knowledge Management
Unit, School of Public Policy, University College London, London
WC1H 9QU Correspondence to: M Rigby m.j.rigby{at}keele.ac.uk
Information and its handling and transmission form an
essential part of health care and are reflected in professional
standards. Automated information systems in health care However, as new information and communication technologies in
health bring new opportunities, they also bring new risks. Emphasis has
rightly been placed on ensuring appropriate levels of confidentiality in electronic information systems
If informatics systems are increasingly essential in the delivery
of health care then their integrity and quality must be of equal
importance, but this has been scarcely recognised to date. In 1963 the
then UK secretary of state for health stated to the House of Commons:
"The House and the public suddenly woke up to the fact that any
. . . manufacturer could market any product, however
inadequately tested, however dangerous, without having to satisfy any
independent body as to its efficacy and safety and the public was
almost uniquely unprotected in this respect."6 That
statement related to drugs, being triggered by the thalidomide disaster, and the situation was changed rapidly. However, the same
situation applies today with regard to electronic health informatics
products and services, which are now the most important unregulated
healthcare resource When errors and failures have occurred it has generally been in the
interests of suppliers, provider organisations, and clinicians to
quietly rectify or remove the flawed systems rather than draw attention
to them. This, however, allows for unidentified and thus unquantified
errors to be dispersed, with potential risk to patient health. Box 1
gives published examples of such health threatening errors in computer
software. In a modern consumerist environment, however, this situation
is unacceptable, as shown by the public furore over the software that
miscalculated the risk of Down's syndrome in
pregnancies.10
Box 1
: Examples of health-threatening software errors
Recently, a European project The project arose from an expert conference at Turku University
in 1997 organised by JF, which resulted in several published articles.12-14 The work of the project was undertaken by
representatives of five European countries; details of the membership
and working reports can be found on the Multimedica
website.15
For the project, we classified health informatics services into
three categories In the health sector, precedents have been set in the regulation of
drugs and medical devices, but neither of these is directly applicable
to health informatics services. Safety control of new drugs now depends
largely on controlled trials, which are neither feasible nor affordable
as a mandatory control for clinical software or internet sites.
Regulation of medical devices has several similarities, but key
differences are the much wider range of user proficiency and
circumstances of use of informatics systems compared with medical
devices and the difficulties of ensuring structured user training and education.
We next considered how best to categorise risk in health
informatics services, as it is only by identifying risk that
appropriate control methods can be identified. For medical devices, the
regulations are clear and helpful: they require that a device's
manufacturer or supplier identifies the risk level as determined by the
type of product and how life critical are the circumstances of its use.16 We concluded that risk in health informatics
services depends on a combination of type of user, circumstances of
use, type of use, and nature of the system. For example, a failure in
an automated appointments system can have serious consequences by
passing undetected, whereas an experienced clinician may filter out
spurious results from a diagnostic support tool used merely as an aide
memoire. The table shows the different levels of risk associated
with different health informatics services.
We sought to identify and quantify the risks attributable to
informatics services, and the degree of concern they produced. A
comprehensive literature search and a small targeted survey of European
opinion leaders from health and consumer domains showed that the
problem was, if anything, greater than anticipated.15
Clinical software
Telemedicine
Internet sites
Project survey
In view of the need to avoid identified risks to the public, and
the professional opinion in favour of some form of regulation, we
concluded that specially crafted regulation was needed based on
existing European experience with product control and monitoring health
risks. The components suggested are as follows.
CE marking
Labelling
Box 2
: Suggested labelling requirements for clinical software
health
informatics services
will improve these functions and bring new
opportunities through the harnessing of modern information and
communications technologies. Thus, computer support is now essential in
many parts of medicine, the US Institute of Medicine has long espoused the value of computerised patient records,1 and many
countries have developed strategies on this topic, and there are
countless health related internet sites.
to the point that the highly exacting requirements being demanded by independent commentators and
professional bodies2 are difficult to satisfy without
jeopardising the functioning of core services
3 4
or the
interests of the most vulnerable groups.5 In contrast,
much less thought has been given so far to ensuring the appropriateness
of the design and integrity of functioning of health informatics
services.
Summary points
Like drugs 40 years ago, products in health informatics are
unregulated with regard to safety and efficacy
A European project has now recommended ways of accrediting healthcare
related software, telemedicine, and internet sites
A scheme like CE marking of electrical goods is recommended for
software, national regulatory bodies should be identified for
telemedicine, and a European certification of integrity scheme
developed for websites
![]()
Importance of quality assurance of health informatics systems
in sharp contrast to drugs, medical devices, and
licensed health professionals.
![]()
The TEAC-Health project
towards European accreditation and
certification of telematics services in health (TEAC-Health)
was conducted to investigate the issues, and we report its core findings here. The findings outlined in the project report11 have
recently been formally accepted by the European Commission, which
intends to examine in detail the steps required for their
implementation (Jean-Claude Healy, head of health applications unit,
Information Society Directorate-General, personal communication, 2000).
![]()
Classification of health informatics services
software and related services, telemedicine, and
internet sites. Although many services combine more than one of these
elements, the quality assurance and regulatory components for each need
to be considered separately as the issues are quite distinct. We also
felt it inappropriate to consider processes of quality assurance
and verification solely in the health sector and therefore looked at
commercial approaches such as regulation in the financial sector and at
other areas of public risk such as air traffic control and food safety.
![]()
A taxonomy of risk assessment
![]()
Quantification of the problem
Many of the problems identified when using clinical software are
resolved between supplier and user on condition that there is no
publicity, while the problems that are not identified cannot, by
definition, be reported. Thus the literature will substantially underestimate these problems, but some errors have been reported (see box 1), as has the adverse outcome of software upgrades producing erroneous printed interpretations of previously recorded diagnostic data.17
Less has been published about the risks of telemedicine services
because of their comparative newness. However, we identified concerns
about authenticity and risks in telemedicine services, including email
consultations, other than those within a single provider organisation
or on a closed, point to point basis.15 There are
indications that a quarter of those offering telemedicine consultations
directly to the general public do not hold the qualifications they
claim (S Schanz, personal communication, 2000), and others may be
offering advice beyond their qualifications. Studies have shown there
is wide variation in the quality of advice provided, and, although
guidance may generally be sound, the occurrence of so many outliers is
an unacceptable and avoidable risk.
18 19
Services on the world wide web are the most obvious risk, as
anyone can publish any information they like. Much of this information
is valuable and the internet allows freedom of expression for patient
support groups and leaders in alternative therapies, but studies have
shown that both misleading and life threatening advice is readily
available.
20 21
A figure of 1400 "suspicious"
websites was reported by the coordinator of a study for the G8 group of
countries, with a 21% increase in that number annually,22
and a recent US study found errors and contradictions even within
sites.23 Yet, by its very nature, the internet cannot be
controlled or censored.
Our survey of opinion leaders, for which we used a "snowball
sample" method, yielded 54 respondents, of whom 36 (67%) indicated
that they had experienced one or more problems with health telematics
services. Of the 74 problems reported, 10 adversely affected patient
safety, four adversely affected optimum treatment of a patient, and 31 adversely affected the health professional's duty of care to a
patient. Of all the respondents, 19 were "very concerned" about the
current lack of quality assurance of telematics services and a further
22 had some concerns, giving a total of 41 (76%) "concerned."
![]()
TEAC-Health recommendations for clinical software
Applying this publicly understood and reliable mark on approved
goods is a well established process in Europe based on clear
regulation24 and with variants for medical
devices.16 However, further research is needed on the
specific criteria to accommodate clinical software. This will require a
"notified body" to have overall responsibility and to identify and
monitor essential requirements for these products and services. As
concurrent verification of design and quality is far more effective
than retrospective testing, the necessary identification of control
measures for production and quality assurance will itself yield
invaluable standards for clinical software developers.
A legally underpinned requirement for accurate and detailed
labelling is a key element of our proposed solution, as this will
enable purchasing organisations and clinical users to know much more
about the software product. Identification of named responsible
individuals will also substantially increase the commitment to ensure
quality of design and manufacture. The exact requirements will need
further discussion and definition, but box 2 shows a suggested
list.
"Hotline" for postmarketing surveillance
An essential part of CE marking is postmarketing surveillance, in
particular the requirement that the supplier provides a "hotline"
telephone number to which any problem or concern can be reported. It is
also a statutory requirement of CE marking that all serious incidents
are reported by the supplier to a "competent authority," and this
process is liable to unannounced audit on site.
National hotlines and monitoring organisations
Based broadly on existing models for drug products and
medical devices, national hotlines and monitoring organisations are
necessary for clinical software to ensure that problems such as adverse
interactions between different products (see box 1) can be identified
speedily. They are of proved benefit for other clinical products and
already apply to health software in Sweden.
In house software and informatics services
Software and services developed by particular healthcare
organisations for their own use cannot readily be subjected to
compulsory CE marking as they are not marketed products. However, our
proposed regulation would bring two safeguards. Firstly, the identification of professional standards would form a yardstick for
identifying reasonable practice and duty of care should there be a
formal complaint or litigation. Secondly, in house products could be
submitted voluntarily to the verification process.
| |
TEAC-Health recommendations for telemedicine |
|---|
Telemedicine presents an entirely different situation because
telecommunications based services that cross legislative boundaries are
almost free of regulation. Thus, providers of healthcare services could
escape regulation, particularly when moving to the internet. Since this
leaves patients at risk, some control mechanisms are needed. In
principle, legislation should be independent of the communication
medium used
namely, the same ethical principles and liabilities should
apply to telemedicine as to conventional patient care. Because
telemedicine services can readily cross international boundaries,
international coordination or coregulation is needed in Europe and
beyond. Similarly, in countries such as the United States regulation is
at the state level, leading to complex and unwieldy situations that
hamper legitimate national providers and thus also patients.
Key elements of regulating telemedicine services should include international agreement as to whether such services are delivered under the law of the supplier or that of the consumer. The European Permanent Committee of Physicians (EPCP) now favours accepting European law that it is the supplier's legal system that applies (Ä Markku, chairman, EPCP, personal communication, 2000). Secondly, labelling (as above) with legal sanctions should be required, linked to a code of conduct, which needs to be developed. Box 3 shows proposed key elements.
|
Global regulation
A global regulatory framework is also important. There are clear
and effective global conventions and supervisory organisations for both
civil aviation and food standards, both of which operate on an evidence
based principle, obtaining and interpreting emergent scientific
evidence in order to formulate new standards that then become the basis
for universally agreed international regulation. Delivery of
telemedicine services internationally puts individual patients at risk
of injury or death through incompetent or malicious unregulated
providers, but, because the transactions are individual and
confidential, adverse outcomes are not as conspicuous as in domains
such as civil aviation. The same situation applied to pharmaceutical
products until regulation.6 The global risk to personal
health continues unabated in the absence of international agreement on
regulation, liability, and control. We consider international telemedicine to deserve at least the same level of regulation as the
civil aviation and food sectors. This could also aid the development of
national frameworks, especially in countries with largely independent
states or provinces.
| |
TEAC-Health recommendations for internet sites |
|---|
We believe that the cost of developing a system solely to verify the quality of health internet sites would be high and that it would be impractical. The Health on the Net Foundation (HON) has for some time been promoting a voluntary code of conduct, and there have been several overlapping initiatives in the United States (see box 4), but their main drawback is that there is no external verification and so the system is open to abuse and, indeed, offers false security.
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However, the need for independently verified sites is common to many other internet activities, including retailing.25 As with CE marking and other recognised quality standards, the power of effective regulation depends on the universality of use leading to public recognition. We studied earlier attempts to identify high quality sites to the public, the best known being filtering mechanisms and rating systems.11 Both have drawbacks.
Most filtering excludes inappropriate items but also excludes many relevant sites, as it is difficult to develop a 100% specific yet sensitive filter that does not filter out required material. For example, a filter designed to protect against pornography will exclude sites with the word "breast," but it will also filter out important medical sites. Such "heuristic" filtering depends on finding and interpreting key words. The alternative, "filtering in," requires the site to undertake self rating honestly and accurately.
Rating systems depend on third parties such as informed users to provide a rating and score for each individual site, but this raises questions of ensuring objectivity, impartiality, and common clinical and cultural values to the extent that there are now proposals for rating the raters. Moreover, this leaves most sites unrated. Clearly, these methods are not feasible to aid general public users, nor indeed most health professional users unfamiliar with the intricacies of the internet. Box 5 summarises the issues.
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The EuroSeal proposal
We have therefore proposed development of a new European system
and standard, entitled the EuroSeal.
12 15
This would be a
seal supplied to a website by an accredited agency (the approach
fundamental to CE marking). Once attached to the site, its integrity
would be verified by secure single socket layer or similar secure
software, as currently happens with secure trading sites. The seal
would be provided at two levels, the higher of which would require
independent onsite verification (for a higher fee). The verification
processes would be open and transparent
by clicking on the
EuroSeal symbol, visitors to the site would see details of the site
inspections, drawn in real time from the records of the accrediting
body (as applies with current secure links for web commerce), as well
as the code(s) of conduct to which the site adhered.
Codes of conduct
These are an important element of the EuroSeal approach, as they
would form the basis on which the third party assessed a site
provider's claims and decided whether to award the EuroSeal. Each
health professional body would be able to devise its own codes of
conduct and standards, and viewers would know against which code the
EuroSeal had been applied. This approach would also allow special
interest groups
such as ethnic groups, those with particular religious
beliefs, and advocates of alternative medicine
to devise their own
codes of conduct. Patient support groups could also devise codes of
conduct, provided they met a prescribed framework and standard for codes.
| |
Conclusions |
|---|
Health informatics systems are invaluable to aid health care. Moreover, they bring intrinsic advantages, such as electronic records being more accessible than paper ones and, if properly protected and encrypted, being more secure from damage or prying. However, this is no excuse not to address current known and avoidable risks.
The TEAC-Health project has clearly shown that public safety and
professional integrity are threatened by the lack of regulation of
health informatics services. These risks will increase rapidly as
health informatics services expand and as telecommunications and
globalisation radically change attitudes to and delivery of health
care.
26 27
Initiatives to date have been based on
restricted research, lacked consideration of overall feasibility and
other issues, or depend on the (usually unpublished) integrity and
values of a secondary service provider. The strategic proposals we
describe, which have now been welcomed by the European Commission, form an evidence based solution.
| |
Footnotes |
|---|
Competing interests: JW has a small part of the equity of Medix, an internet service provider for doctors, and receives research and consultancy funding from various commercial sources.
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|---|
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(Accepted 19 July 2001)
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