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Kenneth D Mandl a Division of Emergency Medicine, Children's
Hospital, 300 Longwood Avenue, Boston, MA 02115, USA, b Laboratory for
Computer Science, Medical Decision Group, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA
Correspondence to: K D Mandl Kenneth_Mandl{at}Harvard.edu
A patient's medical records are generally fragmented
across multiple treatment sites, posing an obstacle to clinical care, research, and public health efforts.1 Electronic medical
records and the internet provide a technical infrastructure on which to build longitudinal medical records that can be integrated across sites
of care. Choices about the structure and ownership of these records
will have profound impact on the accessibility and privacy of patient
information. Already, alarming trends are apparent as proprietary
online medical record systems are developed and deployed. The
technology promising to unify the currently disparate pieces of a
patient's medical record may actually threaten the accessibility of
the information and compromise patients' privacy.2 In
this article we propose two doctrines and six desirable characteristics to guide the development of online medical record systems. We describe
how such systems could be developed and used clinically.
No single institution can hope to encompass a patient's entire
record. Ideally, it should be possible to create or assemble each
patient's personal health record so that it is accessible at all
points of care within the health service and contains data from all
institutions involved in that patient's care. Two main impediments
stand in the way of this ideal. Firstly, most healthcare institutions
do not provide effective access for patients to their own data and,
despite technical feasibility,3 they show little willingness to share data with their competitors.4
Secondly, patients are becoming increasingly anxious about the privacy
of their medical records.5 Such concerns seem justified
when one considers that, under current laws and practices, identifiable medical data are routinely shared with insurance companies, government, researchers, employers, state bureaus of vital statistics, pharmacy benefit managers (companies that track doctors' drug prescriptions), local retail pharmacies, attorneys, and others.6
We propose two doctrines to guide the development of electronic
medical records: firstly, that record systems should be designed so
that they can exchange all their stored data according to public standards and, secondly, that patients should have control over access
and permissions. Building software compliant with public standards will
enable connectivity and interoperability Public standards
Summary points
Electronic medical record systems should be designed so that they
can exchange all their stored data according to public standards
Giving patients control over permissions to view their record
as well
as creation, collation, annotation, modification, dissemination, use,
and deletion of the record
is key to ensuring patients' access to
their own medical information while protecting their privacy
Many existing electronic medical record systems fragment medical
records by adopting incompatible means of acquiring, processing,
storing, and communicating data
Record systems should be able to accept data (historical, radiological,
laboratory, etc) from multiple sources including physician's offices,
hospital computer systems, laboratories, and patients' personal
computers
Consumers are managing bank accounts, investments, and purchases on
line, and many turn to the web for gathering information about medical
conditions; they will expect this level of control to be extended to
online medical portfolios
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Medical information: access and privacy
Top
Medical information: access and...
Doctrines for developing...
Desirable characteristics of...
Challenges and limitations for...
Conclusions
References
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Doctrines for developing electronic medical
records
Top
Medical information: access and...
Doctrines for developing...
Desirable characteristics of...
Challenges and limitations for...
Conclusions
References
even of diverse systems.
Patients' control will allow protection of privacy according to
individual preferences and help prevent some of the current misuses of
personal medical information. The purpose behind these doctrines is to
ensure long term access of patients and care providers to medical
records for clinical use while minimising the risk to patients' privacy.
Some of the stresses on the doctor-patient relationship could be
eased by using computerised and internet based tools for decision
support, communications,
7 8
and documentation.1 As medical care increasingly depends on
computerisation, software engineering and marketing practices become
more relevant to issues of healthcare delivery and patients' rights.
Unfortunately, many current systems fragment medical records by using
incompatible means of acquiring, processing, storing, and communicating
data. These incompatibilities may result from a failure to recognise the need for interoperability or they may be deliberate, with the aim
of locking consumers into using a particular system. Either way, the
practice precludes sharing of data across different applications and institutions.
Patient control
Substantial problems arise if patients cannot trust that their
medical data will be used only in the ways they intend. If patients
feel that they have no control over the fate of their medical
information, they might fail to disclose important medical data or even
avoid seeking medical care because of concern over denial of insurance,
loss of employment or housing, or stigmatisation and embarrassment.
Expectation of privacy allows trust and improves communications between
doctors and patients.
10 11
as well as over its creation,
collation, annotation, modification, dissemination, use, and
deletion
is key to ensuring patients' access to their own medical
information while protecting their privacy.
| |
Desirable characteristics of electronic medical records |
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|
|
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In order to comply with the doctrines of public standards and patient control, designers of medical record systems should strive to imbue their products with the following characteristics.
Comprehensiveness
Because care is normally provided to a patient by different
doctors, nurses, pharmacists, and ancillary providers, and, with the
passage of time, by different institutions in different geographical
areas, each provider must be able to know what others are currently
doing and what has previously been done. Outpatient records should
contain, at least, problem lists, procedures, allergies, medications,
immunisations, history of visits, family medical history, test results,
doctors' and nursing notes, referral and discharge summaries,
patient-provider communications,14 and patient directives.
The records must also span a lifetime, so that a patient's medical and
treatment history is available as a baseline and for retrospective analysis.
Accessibility
Medical records may be needed on a predictable basis (as at a
scheduled doctor's visit) or on the spur of the moment (as in an
emergency). They may be needed at a patient's usual place of care or
far from home. They may be needed when the patient can consent to their
use or when he or she is unconscious and only personal or societal
policy can dictate use. Ideally, the records would be with the patient
at all times, but alternatively they should be universally available,
such as on the world wide web. In addition, with patients' permission,
these records should be accessible to and usable by researchers and
public health authorities.
Interoperability
Different computerised medical systems should be able to share
records: they should be able to accept data (historical, radiological,
laboratory, etc) from multiple sources, including doctors' offices,
hospital computer systems, laboratories, and patients' personal
computers. Without interoperability, even electronic medical records
will remain fragmented.
Confidentiality
Patients should have the right to decide who can examine and alter
what part of their medical records.
2 10
In principle a
patient might choose to allow no access to such records, though at the
risk of receiving uninformed and thus inferior care. At the other
extreme some might have no hesitation in making their records
completely public. For most patients, the appropriate degree of
confidentiality will fall in between and will be a compromise between
privacy and the desire to receive informed help from medical practitioners. Because an individual may have different preferences about different aspects of his or her medical history, access to
various parts of the record should be authorised independently. For
example, psychiatric notes may deserve closer protection than immunisation history. Further, patients should be able to grant different access rights to different providers, based either on their
role or on the particular individual. Most patients will probably also
choose to provide a confidentiality "override" policy that would
allow an authenticated healthcare provider in an emergency to gain
access to records that he or she would not normally be able to, though
at the cost of triggering an automatic audit.
Accountability
Any access to or modification of a patient's record should be
recorded and visible to the patient. Thus, data and judgments entered
into the record must be identifiable by their source. Patients should
be able to annotate and challenge interpretations in their records,
though we believe they should not be able to delete or alter
information entered by others. Patients should also be able to see who
has accessed any parts of their record, under what circumstances, and
for what purpose. Reliable authentication is essential to make this
feasible. Appropriate laws can reinforce accountability built into the
records system.
Flexibility
We believe that most people want to make data about themselves
available to those genuinely trying to improve medical knowledge, the
practice of medicine, the cost effectiveness of care, and the education
of the next generation of healthcare providers. This altruism has
limits, however, when patients feel the threat of exploitation, the
risk to privacy, or the annoyance of unsolicited follow up contacts.
Patients should therefore be able to grant or deny study access to
selected personal medical data. This can be based on personal policies
or decisions about specific studies. An example policy might say that
any study may use data if they will be stored only in aggregated,
non-identifiable form.
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Challenges and limitations for electronic medical records |
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We are, with colleagues, implementing a patient controlled medical record system that follows our doctrines. Called PING (Personal Internetworked Notary and Guardian), 15 16 it was developed under the Federal Next Generation Internet Initiative. 17 18 We face important challenges in implementing personally controlled systems on a large scale. No matter how well these are integrated with institutional information systems, it is unlikely that patient controlled records would entirely replace provider or hospital based records. For important clinical, financial, and medicolegal reasons, providers need control over their own version of patients' medical histories. However, it is quite possible that, with appropriate consent and access privileges, portions of the personally controlled records would be downloaded into the institutional record to complement the existing data.
No matter how sophisticated security systems become, people will always manage to defeat them. If by no other means, they may be able to exploit human weakness to subvert someone with legitimate access to the data. Fortunately, technical advances in security systems for electronic records should continue to be driven forward by the commercial interests of companies doing business over the internet. In fact, we may need considerable further evolution of accepted policies and laws so that patients are not coerced into signing away their privacy rights to obtain care or reimbursement.
The widespread adoption of patient controlled health records that we
propose will depend on solutions being found to several challenging
technical and policy issues. No computer system has ever remained
operational for the lifetime of a typical person; hence we will need
procedures to migrate records to new computer systems and
architectures. The contentious issue of how patients may be uniquely
identified might entangle our design choices and desire for a
distributed system of records. We will need to develop acceptable
procedures for backing up data, anticipating recovery in case of
disasters, agreeing on whether emergency overrides of patient's
policies are ever acceptable, whether it is possible to retract access
to data once it has been given, who is trusted to conduct audits and
what rights they have to sanction violators of policy, and many other procedures.
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Conclusions |
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Computerised medical information systems are at the start of what promises to be a rapid evolution.19 We are still in a position to look ahead and consider the promise and pitfalls of such systems as we design and deploy them. We need not feel wedded to the structure and processes of current systems. In fact, it seems increasingly unlikely that an electronic longitudinal medical record will be produced as an outgrowth of the traditional institutional medical record.
In order for electronic medical records to eliminate the fragmentation
of health information, be universally accessible, and guard patients'
privacy, systems must be built according to public standards and
controlled by patients.
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Footnotes |
|---|
Funding: This work was supported by the National Library of Medicine Next Generation Internet Initiative Contract N01-LM-9-3536 and by a grant from the National Library of Medicine, 1 R01 LM06587-01.
Competing interests: None declared.
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References |
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|
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| 1. | Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council. Networking health: prescriptions for the internet. (prepublication copy). Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2000. |
| 2. |
Hodge Jr JG, Gostin LO, Jacobson PD.
Legal issues concerning electronic health information: privacy, quality, and liability.
JAMA
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282:
1466-1471 |
| 3. | Van Wingerde FJ, Schindler J, Kilbridge P, Szolovits P, Safran C, Rind D, et al. Using HL7 and the world wide web for unifying patient data from remote databases. Proc AMIA Annu Fall Symp 1996:643-7. |
| 4. | Kohane IS, van Wingerde FJ, Fackler JC, Cimino C, Kilbridge P, Murphy S, et al. Sharing electronic medical records across multiple heterogeneous and competing institutions. Proc AMIA Annu Fall Symp 1996:608-12. |
| 5. | Harris-Equifax. Consumer privacy survey, conducted for Equifax by Louis Harris and Associates in association with Dr Alan Westin of Columbia University. Atlanta, GA: Equifax, 1996. |
| 6. | Computer Science and Telecommunications Board NRC. For the record: protecting electronic health information. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1997. |
| 7. |
Mandl KD, Kohane IS, Brandt AM.
Electronic patient-physician communication: problems and promise.
Ann Intern Med
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495-500 |
| 8. |
Ferguson T.
Digital doctoring opportunities and challenges in electronic patient-physician communication [editorial].
JAMA
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| 9. | Health Level Seven (HL7). www.HL7.org (accessed April 2000). |
| 10. |
Gostin L.
Health care information and the protection of personal privacy: ethical and legal considerations.
Ann Intern Med
1997;
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683-690 |
| 11. | Institute for Health Care Research and Policy, Georgetown University. Health privacy project. 1999. www.healthprivacy.org/ (accessed 29 Nov 2000). |
| 12. | Ferguson T. Health online and the empowered medical consumer. Jt Comm J Qual Improv 1997; 23: 251-257[Medline]. |
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Winker MA, Flanagin A, Chi-Lum B, White J, Andrews K, Kennett RL, et al.
Guidelines for medical and health information sites on the internet: principles governing AMA web sites. American Medical Association.
JAMA
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283:
1600-1606 |
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Kane B, Sands DZ.
Guidelines for the clinical use of electronic mail with patients. The AMIA Internet Working Group, Task Force on Guidelines for the Use of Clinic-Patient Electronic Mail.
J Am Med Inform Assoc
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5:
104-111 |
| 15. | United States National Library of Medicine. Next generation internet phase II awards. 1999. www.nlm.nih.gov/research/ngisumphase2.html (updated 10 Dec 1999). |
| 16. | Riva A, Mandl KD, Oh DH, Szolovits P, Kohane IS. The personal internetworked notary and guardian. Int J Med Inf (in press). |
| 17. |
Shortliffe EH.
Health care and the next generation internet [editorial].
Ann Intern Med
1998;
129:
138-140 |
| 18. | Next Generation Internet Initiative. NGI Initiative home page. www.ngi.gov (accessed 29 Nov 2000). |
| 19. | Bates D. Commentary: quality, costs, privacy, and electronic medical data. J Law Med Ethics 1997; 25: 111-112[Medline]. |
(Accepted 3 October 2000)
David Markwell Clinical Information
Consultancy, Reading RG30 2SN
david{at}clinical-info.co.uk
Mandl and colleagues' vision of a longitudinal electronic
health record providing individual patient information when and where
needed is underpinned by two principles The authors refer to the efforts of HL7 to develop public standards for
health communication. In Europe CEN TC251 (European Committee for
Standardization, Technical Committee for Health Informatics) undertakes
similar activities, and a four part, preliminary standard on
communication of electronic healthcare records was adopted in June
1999.1 This has been the basis for prototype messages in
the NHS, including one for communication of records between general
practice computer systems validated by clinicians and
developers.2
Cooperation between European and US bodies on standards was formalised
early this year by a memorandum of understanding signed by CEN TC251
and HL7. Convergence has been accelerated by the formation of HL7
affiliate organisations in many European countries, including
Britain.3 The main efforts in developing standards for
medical records are now based on common methods and common technical
solutions such as extensible markup language (XML). This follows global
trends towards public, web based standards and is in full accord with
the UK e-government interoperability framework.4
The foundations are in place for public standards on which to base
communication of electronic records. However, views on the shape of
standard records differ in emphasis: some anticipate records consisting
of a collection of web documents, whereas others emphasise the
importance of coded structured data that can be retrieved for
aggregation, analysis, and decision support. The challenge is to build
on the strengths of both approaches to develop record systems that are
useful as well as user friendly. These systems must serve the wide
range of purposes identified in the recent study of electronic patient
records for primary care5 and should have the attributes
identified in the Institute of Medicine's 1991 report of computer
based patient records.6 Patient record systems must allow
clinical statements to be faithfully recorded and retrieved, taking
account of the interplay between record structure, terminology, and context.
Mandl and colleagues address the question of privacy by proposing a
personal health record controlled by patients themselves. Data
protection legislation in Europe7 and the Caldicott
report's guidelines for the NHS8 differ from the rules
applicable in the United States, but the need for a balance between
privacy and legitimate demands for information is international.
Patients' control of records solves some problems but may prevent
professionals from accessing the information they need in order to
fulfil, or show that they have fulfilled, their responsibilities.
The legitimate uses of patients' records are diverse, so it may be
premature to adopt a single, all purpose electronic record for every
patient. A single widely accessible, comprehensive patient record is
not a substitute for appropriate communications, such as concise
referral notes or discharge summaries. The immediate priority is to
ensure that electronic records are fit for the purposes for which they
are used. As the authors argue, common communication protocols and
message formats based on publicly available standards are a
prerequisite for any further progress in electronic patient records.
Rhona MacDonald BMJ
rmacDonald{at}bmj.com
I still blush with embarrassment when I remember the
horror of lying in a hospital bed and listening to my medical history being discussed by all and sundry. Doctors, nurses, medical students, pharmacists Here is my dilemma. I want my notes to be strictly confidential but
readily accessible to those who need them. Electronic notes, while
potentially solving my second problem, sets alarm bells ringing with
regard to the first. I am not a technophobe, but I am wary of
giving out personal financial information over the internet, and
the thought of my entire medical history floating somewhere in
cyberspace doesn't fill me with confidence. Perhaps I have seen too
many films about ingenious hackers.
Even if I can get over my suspicion of electronic notes, new dilemmas
arise. According to Mandl and colleagues, I will be able to choose who
I want to look at my notes, what bits I want them to look at, and,
finally, whether I want to provide an "override" policy that would
allow a healthcare worker to confound my carefully thought out plan in
an emergency and gain access to records that he or she would not
normally be authorised to see. Call me suspicious, but what is to stop
those who want access to my notes against my wishes declaring an
emergency and pressing that button whenever they feel like it? To be
fair, the authors do say that I will be able to see who has accessed my
record and under what circumstances, but by that stage it might be a
bit late.
The best bit is that I will be able to annotate and disagree with
interpretations in my records, although I will not be able to alter or
delete them. Wow! I bet this will have doctors in Britain reeling in
horror. Not only will I be able to read my own notes but I can disagree
with what is written about me and discuss it with my doctor. I think
that, in Britain at least, the doctor-patient relationship will have to
come a long way before doctors are willing to give patients this amount
of autonomy. I would be delighted, however, if this ever became a reality.
In conclusion, I don't want much
the need for public standards
and the need to respect patients' right to privacy. These issues are
at the heart of any coherent approach to electronic patient records.
The internet introduces a global dimension, limiting the longevity of
isolated national initiatives. It is therefore timely that this US
article raises key issues that should command general interest.
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References
1.
European Committee for Standardization, Technical
Committee for Health Informatics. CEN/TC251. www.centc251.org (accessed
29 Nov 2000).
2.
Markwell DC, Fogarty L, Hinchley A.
Validation of a European message standard for electronic health records.
In:
Kokol P, Zupan B, Stare J, Premik M, Engelbrecht R, eds.
Medical informatics Europe '99.
Amsterdam: IOS Press, 1999:818-823.
3.
HL7-UK (Health Level Seven UK). www.hl7.org.uk (accessed 29 Nov 2000).
4.
Cabinet Office, Central IT Unit. e-Government interoperability
framework. www.citu.gov.uk/egif.htm (updated Sep 2000).
5.
NHS Executive. ScopeEPR
Royal College of General
Practitioners Health Informatics Task Force electronic patient record
study. www.schin.ncl.ac.uk/rcgp/scopeEPR/report/index22.htm (updated 13 Jul 2000).
6.
Dick RS, Steen EB, eds.
The computer-based patient record: an essential technology for health care.
Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1994:recommendation 1.
7.
Council of Europe.
Convention for the protection of individuals with regard to the automatic processing of personal data (European treaty series No 108).
Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1981. (www.coe.fr/eng/legaltxt/108e.htm#debut)
8.
Department of Health.
Report on the review of patient-identifiable information (Caldicott committee).
London: DoH, 1997.
Commentary: A patient's viewpoint
everyone, it seemed to me
were poring over my open hospital notes with enthusiastic curiosity. I suppose even the cleaner
could have had a look had she been so inclined. However, I also recall
the frustration of being pointlessly reinvestigated because I had been
referred to a different consultant who didn't have access to my old
notes. This resulted in repeated invasive investigations, x
rays, and scans and on one occasion being bled for 17 tubes of blood in
the one sitting, a record even for me.
just for my medical records to be
seen only by those whom I authorise, and for the records to be readily
accessible to them wherever they are. My medical history may not mean
much to others, but it is an important part of my life and I would like
others to treat it with the respect it deserves. Also, thanks to this
article putting the notion in my head, I would like a bigger say in
what goes into my notes, and if I don't like something I would like it
taken out. Somehow I think I will have to wait a long time for that to
happen. Maybe electronic notes like those described are the way
forward, but at the moment I view them with optimistic scepticism.
© BMJ 2001
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