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Preventing errors lies in redesign
not
exhortation
Again, a young patient with leukaemia is dying, not
from his disease, but from an erroneous intrathecal injection of
vincristine, intended for intravenous use.1 Again, the
newspapers express outrage; they count up to 13 identical cases over
the past 15 years. The hospital apologises, again, and two doctors are
suspended, pending "investigation." The NHS explains; steps will be
taken, again.
And trust erodes, again, as a confused public, grieving with the
patient and his family, wonder if they are safe. Spurred by the
headlines, each asks, again, "Could I be next?" The answer, of
course, is, "Yes."
Less than a year ago the chief medical officer of England's NHS, in a
landmark report on threats to patient safety in the NHS, courageously
labelled the problem of medical errors as pervasive and consequential.
He promised progress and even specified this very error- The answer is surprisingly mundane. It is this: we are human, and
humans err.3 Despite outrage, despite grief, despite experience, despite our best efforts, despite our deepest wishes, we
are born fallible and will remain so.
There are two video rental stores in my town Being careful helps, but it brings us nowhere near perfection.
When the stakes are high The remedy is in changing systems of work. The remedy is in
design.
3 5
A small number of children used to be killed
each year by their parents' inadvertently backing their cars over them as they switched to reverse gear. The car would suddenly jump back and
strike the child. That almost never happens today because almost all
cars with automatic transmissions have a lockout feature: they cannot
be switched into reverse gear unless the driver's foot depresses the
brake pedal. A small number of patients used to die each year in
operating theatres because the anaesthetist inadvertently connected the
nitrous oxide tank to the oxygen line and vice versa. That almost never
happens now, because the connecting fittings for oxygen and nitrous
oxide have been made different from Equipment is not the only possible object for productive redesign. We
can, using modern principles from human factors engineering, reliability sciences, research on group dynamics, communication theory,
and semiotics (to name but a few relevant disciplines), devise better
job and task designs, better alarms and signalling systems, better
communication patterns, better team training, and better simulation
environments for skill building.6 All these can help bring
us to the safe system that we really want in health care, and all
accept human error as inevitable I do not know what specific design change will make this case of
intrathecal vincristine the very last one. It probably has something to
do with the foolproofing approach that now keeps oxygen and nitrous
oxide separate in surgery. Why should it be possible to connect an
intravenous line to an intrathecal catheter? But, I do know that
expecting perfection in human action, or simply telling our doctors and
nurses to "try harder" The goal should be extreme safety. I believe we should be as safe
in our hospitals as we are in our homes. But we cannot reach that goal
through exhortation, censure, outrage, and shame. We can reach it only
by commitment to change, so that normal, human errors can be made
irrelevant to outcome, continually found, and skilfully mitigated. So
long as it involves humans Institute for Healthcare Improvement, 375 Longwood Avenue,
Boston, MA 02215, USA (dberwick{at}ihi.org)
intrathecal
injection of intravenous chemotherapeutic agents
as one targeted for
"zero" occurrences: not just safer, but perfectly
safe.2 So how could this happen
again?
Blockbuster and West
Coast Video. I rented Pleasantville from Blockbuster and returned it to West Coast Video the next night. I usually do not make
that mistake, but sometimes I do. When it involves videos, it is
inconvenient; when it involves vincristine, it is lethal. But, it is
the same mistake. Among the many errors human beings make
infrequently, but inevitably
is confusing similar tasks. We
always have, and we always will. And, that is only one of the errors
that human beings make
inevitably.
vincristine instead of videos
we attend more
to the details and check each other out. That reduces the error rate,
which is why only 13 patients have died from intrathecal vincristine, not 1300. But just "trying harder" makes no one
superhuman. Exhortation does not help much, nor will suspending the
doctors, nor will outrage in the headlines, nor even will
guilt.4 Suspend every doctor today who makes an error
today, and the error rates in the NHS tomorrow will be exactly the same
as today's. There is no remedy to be found in selecting heroes, nor in
seeking Superman. Tomorrow, like today, we will be human.
and incompatible with
each other
on all anaesthesia machines. Not even a saboteur today, much less a
fatigued doctor, could connect the oxygen line to the nitrous oxide: it
cannot be done.
and design around that fact. The
human factors community has a wonderful saying, "Honour thy user."
not to kill their patients by mistake
has
nothing at all to do with our eventual success.
and thank God it does
health care will
never be free of errors. But it can be free of injury.
Footnotes
The BMJ devoted a theme issue and
a conference last year to reducing medical errors and promoting patient
safety. To read this issue, and for further information on the ideas
advanced in this editorial, please see
http://bmj.com/content/vol320/issue7237/
| 1. | Cancer patient, 18, critical after drug injection blunder. Daily Mail 2001;24 Jan: p11,col 1-3. |
| 2. | Department of Health. An organisation with a memory: report of an expert group on learning from adverse events in the NHS chaired by the Chief Medical Officer. London: Stationery Office, 2000. |
| 3. |
Reason J.
Human error: models and management.
BMJ
2000;
320:
768-770 |
| 4. |
Wu AW.
Medical error: the second victim.
BMJ
2000;
320:
726-727 |
| 5. | Nolan TW. System changes to improve patient safety. BMJ 2000; 320: 770-773[CrossRef]. |
| 6. |
Leape LL, Berwick DM.
Safe health care: are we up to it?
BMJ
2000;
320:
725-726 |
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