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Roderick Neame a Health Information Consulting, Homestall House,
Faversham, Kent ME13 8UT, b Department of Philosophy, University of Victoria,
Victoria, BC, Canada
Correspondence to: R Neame
roddyneame{at}health-info.co.uk
Most clinical facilities are looking towards achieving
seamless integration of services based on a clinical "intranet" and deployment of full electronic records. These developments open a wealth
of opportunities and promise benefits; however, they bring with them
several important concerns and risks, at the root of which are security
issues.1
Computerised and hard copy information
differ in two fundamental ways. One difference relates to perception:
hard copy is something we are all familiar with and feel that we
understand. By contrast, information that is stored in electronic form
is mysterious and therefore a source of anxiety. Understandably, therefore, professionals and the public alike are more concerned about
the security of electronic records, especially not knowing where they
are stored or who controls them. The various well publicised failures
of computerised systems have contributed to this unease.
Summary points
Security remains a critical issue in respect of health
information management systems: too few people understand the risks
inherent in the technology, although anxiety is widespread
Patients assume that care providers are in control of the technology
they use and that the technology is fit for the purpose, but there is
no process of certification for this
The law can offer little useful help: it has always trailed reality,
often by a considerable margin
The goal must be to prevent security breaches, because once they have
happened the damage is already done as far as the patient is concerned
The internet is offering services which are already beginning to affect
the doctor-patient relationship
The second striking difference is that electronically stored data can be manipulated in ways that are impossible with hard copy. For example searching, sorting into categories, matching, and linking one set of data with another and even with other databases is relatively easy with electronic records but difficult with hard copy. Furthermore, these functions can be performed remotely without the user ever being in physical contact with the stored materials.
The contribution of computers to health care will be limited by
the extent to which users and the community of patients come to trust
them to manipulate data and support decisions while protecting their privacy.
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Roles, assumptions, and expectations |
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One of the governing assumptions underlying the introduction of computerised information systems is that their use will facilitate and improve the delivery of health care.2 New systems must meet these demands without overstepping the mark.
Patients
The role of patients in this context is to be the informed
and consenting recipients of the care that is recommended and provided
by doctors and institutions. Patients assume that their providers are
appropriately qualified or certified and in control of any equipment
used (including computers); that their personalised data will be
accessible only to those who are directly or indirectly engaged in
their care; and that identifiable personal information will be withheld
from those who do not have a legitimate and patient centred need to know.
Care service providers
The advent of computerised information systems has added a
new dimension to the relationship between doctors and patients. On the
one hand, the versatile nature of computerised information systems
promises valuable support for decision making and improved delivery of
services. On the other hand, the use of computerised systems
intensifies concerns over privacy and confidentiality, raises new
concerns over technological glitches and communications problems
affecting the availability of appropriate records, and creates a
potential nightmare concerning the quality and integrity (or safety) of
the records themselves.
Institutions
The role of healthcare institutions is defined not only by
their relationship with patients and professionals but also by the fact
that they are corporate entities with their own information needs. The
former mandates concerns for confidentiality, integrity, quality, and
availability: specifically, so far as patients are concerned,
institutions assume an obligation to ensure that computer systems are
safe and that patients' records will be available only to duly
authorised professionals, and in a timely and qualitatively acceptable
fashion. But at the same time the community and corporate nature of
healthcare institutions requires them to access and use some
information relating to healthcare encounters in order to discharge
their obligations to third parties (such as government) and to function
effectively and efficiently as corporate entities. This generates a new
domain of concern arising out of the fear that institutions may stray
beyond what is strictly necessary.
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Managing the risks |
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Accepting the benefit of technology is easy; offsetting it against the risk is harder. Suggestions that the law may assist in the management of these risks is an illusion. The law, whether based on statute or driven by cases, has always trailed reality, often by a considerable margin. The key perspective is that once systems have failed or security has been breached, the damage has been done and there is no way of undoing it. For example, once information has become improperly disclosed it cannot become unknown again. Therefore, instead of detection and punishment of those responsible for security failures or breaches the goal must be to prevent them arising.
Unfortunately, few healthcare providers or institutions seem to have faced up to these issues. Regulatory bodies seem equally at fault for they, too, have failed to lay down clear expectations in respect of uses and abuses of computerised systems. And many governments seem committed to ensuring that information privacy can readily be breached in order to satisfy the overriding consideration of the fight against crime.
Ultimately the risk in health care is borne by the patient, and as
this reality becomes more widely understood patients are beginning to
develop strategies for dealing with it. Recent developments have made
it possible to empower patients to manage some of these issues
themselves without the need for third parties to act as their agents.
Patients increasingly search the world wide web to check whether their
provider is doing everything that appears beneficial in their
situation. Already various web services are offering to hold personal
health records confidentially for their customers (for example,
www.drkoop.com) to use and share as they see fit. Growing public
concern over computerisation is also likely to drive other public trends.
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Conclusion and summary |
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Computer technology is complex and it is difficult to assess the risks to which data within a system are subjected without having considerable expertise; often that assessment cannot readily be made even by the suppliers of a system, and there is little independent expert evaluation of software or systems. This must become a feature of accreditation for practices and institutions that use electronic patient data handling systems.
The ability to handle information systems increasingly constitutes an essential professional skill for clinicians. Competency in using these systems should be included as part of accreditation to practise and continue to be assessed in practice.
Patients are beginning to comprehend the risks they run, and some
are showing a voracious appetite for information and enthusiasm for
monitoring the performance of their care providers. Web based information systems and services are developing fast to meet this patient driven need, which will progressively affect the nature of the
doctor-patient relationship.
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Footnotes |
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Competing interests: None declared.
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References |
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| 1. | SEISMED Consortium. Data Security for Health Care. , Vol 2 Amsterdam: IOS Press, 1996. |
| 2. | Kluge EHW. Health information, the fair information principles and ethics. Methods of Information in Medicine 1994; 33: 336-346[Medline]. |
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