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the hidden costs
Alan Haycox Prescribing Research Group, Pharmacology and
Therapeutics, University of Liverpool, Liverpool L69 3GF
Correspondence to: Dr Haycox AHAY{at}liv.ac.uk
The publication of guidelines for statin treatment in the
United Kingdom attracted criticism, particularly that no attempt had
been made to assess the implications for resources associated with the
guidelines.
1 2
The need to evaluate cost and clinical effectiveness in real terms before the widespread use of a treatment is
frequently acknowledged.3 Unfortunately, these issues are rarely addressed in clinical guidelines, and there is little evidence that cost effectiveness in practice is considered in drawing up guidelines.
4 5
Surprisingly little consideration has been given to the role of
guidelines in a healthcare system in which resources are
constrained.
6 7
Cholesterol lowering drugs epitomise the
problems that affect clinical guidelines in many areas. We consider
here some unintended consequences from the development of guidelines
(whether regulatory or ... supposedly
... advisory) that arise for those funding health care, doctors, and patients.
All clinical guidelines aim to promote "best practices" that
improve the outcomes of treatment.8 This rests on two
assumptions The cost of haste
Modelling cost and outcome
Summary points
Implementation of evidence based guidelines may limit doctors'
discretion and the autonomy of local commissioners
Guidelines allow narrow interest groups to impose their priorities on
the health service
Implications for resources and the real effects of proposals must be
evaluated thoroughly if guidelines are to be of value
Failure to do this may distort decision making in health care; this, in
turn, can lead to unbalanced structures that do not serve the best
interests of patients
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Nature and role of guidelines
firstly, that outcomes identified in clinical trials are
reproducible in normal practice and, secondly, that rapid and universal
adoption of an effective treatment leads to optimal treatment for the
whole population. Guidelines place most weight on evidence generated in
randomised controlled trials. Unfortunately, real life clinical practice, where resources are more restricted, patient compliance less
reliable, and treatment cannot be limited to a narrow patient group,
does not provide such a controlled environment. Consequently, the
anticipated benefits are rarely fully realised in an everyday setting,9 and true therapeutic effectiveness is
established only through the accumulation of practical clinical
experience.
10 11
Guidelines may allow the introduction of new treatments to be fast
tracked, thus bypassing traditional processes of adoption. However, the
time "gained" is not without a cost. This period previously allowed
treatment to be refined and true effectiveness to be evaluated. Costly
new treatments may gain widespread acceptance through over hasty use of
guidelines, when in practice their results may be poorer than
expected.

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Incentive regions for the introduction of new treatment. (The
nature of the incentives is given in the table)
Optimal decision making about treatments requires doctors to
balance incremental changes in patient outcomes with incremental
changes in cost (compared to current treatment). The six distinct
combinations of cost and outcome that may be presented by a new
treatment are illustrated in the figure. In region A, the new treatment
has been proved to worsen the outcome appreciably, in region B it
improves the outcome and reduces the cost of treatment, while in region
E it improves the outcome but increases the cost. In regions C, D, and
F, the impact of the new treatment in practice is still uncertain. In
regions A and B the interests of doctors and health commissioners will
coincide. In regions C and D, given the uncertainty over the impact of
treatment, the most powerful opinion will tend to dominate. In
practice, most conflict arises in region E, where improved outcome is
achieved only at increased cost. Here strong clinical support exists
for a treatment that may shift priorities away from less fashionable
but more cost effective treatments. The natures of the incentive
operating in each case are outlined in the table.
Interested parties
The role of guidelines is complex, inevitably reflecting the
contrasting agendas of various interested parties
professional groups
and clinical enthusiasts are keen to extend their influence, pharmaceutical suppliers to capture and exploit market share, while
local and national authorities seek to promote public health while
restraining public expenditure. It is naive to suppose that any
formulating committee will be immune from these concerns, and we must
therefore take into account the source of a guideline when interpreting
its broader implications for the health service.
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Problems with guidelines |
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A new guideline presents the doctor
with an explicit threshold for treatment, where he or she previously
relied upon professional discretion drawn from accumulated experience. In an increasingly litigious environment, the doctor may opt for safety
first, perceiving the guideline as a minimum level of treatment to be
given. Introducing a guideline will therefore "ratchet up" the
volume of treatment prescribed, overriding professional discretion and
available evidence.
Constraining local flexibility
A guideline issued by a
national body or professional institute may hamper local attempts to
tailor solutions to local needs and resources. Though health
authorities may publish local advice, this will inevitably be heavily
influenced by national guidelines and carries less weight.
Pre-empting resources
Professional and special interest
groups promote guidelines to increase the resources devoted to a
subgroup of the population. It is disingenuous to present these
initiatives in isolation, given that each pound spent on a new
treatment for one group of patients must be at the expense of another
unsuspecting group. Consider, for example, the £8 million annual cost
of statins in one health authority cited by Freemantle et
al.2 The inexorable growth in demand throughout the
healthcare system represents the tyranny of the possible over the
affordable, and the publication of uncosted clinical guidelines only
reinforces this growth dynamic. One example of the danger of
introducing clinical guidelines without previous evaluation of their
implications for resources is provided in the box.
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Case study in dyspepsia
Guidelines based on national recommendations were
developed for the management of dyspepsia in a health
district.12 New patients aged over 45 years who had
symptoms of dyspepsia were to be referred automatically to a
consultant. Previous work showed that the prevalence of dyspepsia in
the community was about 38%, and that about 25% of these patients
visited their general practitioner. This suggested that in any year
over 13 000 people aged over 45 in the health district would be likely
to see their family doctor because of dyspeptic symptoms. (Though not
all of these patients will present with new disease, evidence shows
that the rate of general practitioner consultation for dyspeptic
symptoms is over 50% higher in this age group than in the general
population.14) Conservative estimates showed that applying
these guidelines would require a threefold increase in the number of
endoscopies funded by the health district. This could have been
achieved only by diverting substantial resources from other services.
As a consequence, the recommendations were generally |
Lipid lowering drugs highlight a common
conflict between the development priorities of a resource constrained
health service and the narrow interests of clinical and commercial
innovators. Guidelines are an ideal vehicle for gaining rapid market
dissemination, particularly if they avoid mention of cost altogether.
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Developing better guidelines |
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What value does disseminating clinical guidelines have for the health service? There is a case to be made for stemming the flood of advisory documents and pursuing instead improved professional continuing education and audit based on outcomes. Where guidance is mandatory, the least dangerous form merely cautions against new treatments with limited cost effectiveness and existing treatments that no longer provide adequate value for money.
Any guidelines must start from a patient perspective while encompassing the needs of the whole community. Thus, in diabetes, benefit from reducing lipid concentrations must be compared with other methods of benefiting diabetic patients. The only secure basis for guidelines is a comprehensive assessment of all consequences (direct and indirect) of a new treatment. This requires analysis of the lifetime healthcare experience of the affected group of patients together with any "knock on" consequences for other patient groups. Such an approach requires that the entry of new treatments into the healthcare system should be managed.3 While this may delay access to beneficial innovations, it would ensure that both the costs and consequences of new treatments are fully explored before they become widely available.
Guidelines generate systematic and paternalistic pressure for the many
to conform to the views of the few. They replaces the gradual and time
honoured process by which non-specialists learn from experience with an
attempt to force the pace of disseminating "good practice,"
measured by narrow criteria. The unquestioning pursuit of clinical
guidelines without regard to the added problems and pressures they may
engender poses dangers for us all, representing as it does the exercise
of power without responsibility.
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Acknowledgments |
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Contributors: Each author contributed fully at all stages in the development of the core ideas. The final draft was prepared by AH, who is also the guarantor.
Conflict of interest: None.
Funding: None.
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References |
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(Accepted 6 April 1998)
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