BMJ 1998;317:811 ( 19 September )

Letters

The aftermath of the Bristol case

    Case arose through a failure of action, not of detection
    Doctors should not have to fail before they are given support
    Society of Clinical Psychiatrists supports doctors who have been suspended
    Benefits of openness and teamwork must be emphasised
    Armed forces need independent civilian adviser who can be approached in confidence
    Deaths are acceptable in some specialties but not all
    Series of operations with low mortality may exhibit high average mortality by chance
    Concept of collective responsibility is important
    General Medical Council's disciplinary hearings should be confidential
    Returning contracts to regional level might prevent such cases
    Airline pilots are assessed every six months, so why shouldn't doctors be?
    Supraregional neonatal cardiac surgery works in Western Australia
    Techniques for measuring quality of care need to be assessed
    Students must be taught more about ethics
    Bristol case highlights potential weaknesses of Calman system
    Private practice has similar problems
    Formal mentoring might have helped
    Roles of GMC, royal colleges, and Department of Health remain unclear
    Routine monitoring of mishaps would be valuable way of improving care
    Doctors have surely forfeited privilege of self regulation
    Poor performers will need remedial training

Case arose through a failure of action, not of detection

EDITOR---Smith refers to "key protagonists overreacting" in his editorial on the Bristol case.1 He joins "even the strongest supporters of the Labour government" in bemoaning "its excessive concern with media opinion." Yet he tells us (and, from his privileged platform, the world) that this case is a "once in a lifetime drama..., Shakespearean in its scale and structure," which will have the result that "the trust that patients place in their doctors...will never be the same again."

This is a strange stance for the editor of a scientific journal committed to encouraging rational ideas in medicine. Dramas like this (even dramas that occur more often than once in a lifetime) are certainly "powerful levers for change." But that is not a reason for senior medical journals to seize on them and use them to promote pre-existing agendas of change that have only a tangential bearing.

The lesson of the Bristol tragedy, when the dust and the shouting outside the General Medical Council have subsided, is that there was an inexcusable failure of existing mechanisms of control. The tragedy provides no rational support for the wholesale imposition of systems of monitoring and control on doctors in general. Such systems may or may not be necessary, and the BMJ should be arguing that if they are introduced it should be only with proper testing, so that ill effects (which I2 and others have predicted) can be determined and weighed against the benefits predicted by Smith among others. But that has little to do with the Bristol case. Here the problem was not a failure of detection; it was a failure by those in authority to take any action on the warnings that they repeatedly received. What purpose will all the monitoring in the world serve if society cannot respond to the shouts of warning it is already receiving?

I have not found that the level of trust in my practice has "all changed, changed utterly." This is partly due to patients' well known capacity for exempting their own doctors from the strictures they apply to the profession in general. Of course we must look for careful progress, but this is not the time for responsible journals to indulge in emotive polemic.

James A R Willis, General practitioner
Alton Health Centre, Alton, Hampshire GU34 2QX


  1. Smith R. All changed, changed utterly. BMJ 1998; 316: 1917-1918[Free Full Text]. (27 June.)
  2. Willis JAR. The paradox of progress. Oxford: Radcliffe Medical , 1995.


Doctors should not have to fail before they are given support

EDITOR---The Bristol case has highlighted the need for a system of detecting and rehabilitating doctors not performing to an acceptable standard.1 The General Medical Council's plans for such a system combine, comprehensively, fairness in the process while attempting to secure the safety of the general public.2 Finding these doctors is important, but surely we should ask why we have poorly performing doctors at all.

Poor undergraduate or postgraduate training, communication difficulties, and family or personal problems may be the basis for some poor performance,1 but many good doctors break under the strain of patient demand in impossible circumstances. In my specialty, general practice, some poorly performing doctors are identified in the leafy suburban practices, but most seem to be from the most deprived parts of Britain, often facing a difficult task in single handed practice. I wonder how many of us might become poorly performing doctors if faced with a consultation rate twice the national average, a daily diet of violent drug addicted patients, and constantly vandalised premises.

Doctors working in these circumstances have a choice. They can try hard---and it is hard---to provide the same service to their patients as doctors in more affluent areas provide; they can do this by cutting their list sizes (and of course their incomes). Alternatively, they can do the minimum, developing a siege mentality to protect themselves from patients demanding services they can't provide. This isn't why they became doctors, and gradually they become demoralised and switch off.

It is a tribute to our profession that most doctors facing such difficulties belong to the former group. My practice population has a rate of chronic illness twice the national average, high standardised mortality ratios, and a high unemployment rate, but we receive no deprivation payments. Since the inception of the NHS no partner in my practice has remained until retirement. Some have paid a high personal price for their devotion to their patients. We are fortunate in being well supported by our nursing and clerical staff, but we can see how easy it is to be overwhelmed by workload.

I support the General Medical Council's work in detecting poorly performing doctors at an early stage, but prevention is better than cure. Why should we allow good doctors to be damaged by permitting the sort of working conditions prevalent in many deprived areas? These doctors should not have to fail before they are given support.

Brian McKinstry, General practitioner
Ashgrove Health Centre, Blackburn, West Lothian EH47 7LL


  1. Klein R. Competence, professional self regulation, and the public interest. BMJ 1998; 316: 1740-1742[Free Full Text]. (6 June.)
  2. General Medical Council. Performance procedures; a guide to the new arrangements. London: GMC , 1997.


Society of Clinical Psychiatrists supports doctors who have been suspended

EDITOR---The Society of Clinical Psychiatrists has data on 171 suspensions of senior hospital doctors. Enough details were obtained on 135 completed cases for us to determine the principle trends. In only 22 were the suspensions proved justified; 110 doctors had been wrongly suspended and either had to be reinstated (58) or retired (52) as part of an expensive settlement; and three doctors died as a direct consequence of the suspension.

Thirty eight suspensions were the result of whistleblowing by colleagues or other staff alleging professional incompetence. Ten cases are still outstanding. Fault was proved in only two of the remaining 28. This was despite the odds being heavily against the accused doctor. The prosecution selects and pays most of the members of the disciplinary panel, and the burden of proof is the balance of probabilities rather than the more rigorous "beyond reasonable doubt."

The motives behind the whistleblowing varied. In some cases the motive was intellectual arrogance, particularly in inbred departments. Some colleagues regard a different style of clinical practice as incompetence. Occasionally the morbidity and mortality of patients of the accusers were marginally higher than those of patients of the accused doctor. Other motives included minority intolerance, professional jealousy, and power struggles over control of a hospital department. Such cases are contrary to the Geneva declaration, the United Nations declaration of human rights,1 and the General Medical Council's ethical rules. The suspensions are contrary to European Union law on civil rights.2 But it is easy to dress up allegations so that an administrator suspends the doctor first and investigates afterwards.

Suspensions and the accompanying professional isolation are damaging, and clinical reactive depression may result; the rate of suspensions has doubled in the past year. The Society of Clinical Psychiatrists has established an informal service whereby a consultant psychiatrist provides therapeutic care and if necessary a place of sanctuary (outside the NHS, because the accused doctors do not trust patient confidentiality under these circumstances). The society plans to arrange this scheme more formally, involving over 200 consultant psychiatrists. But why should such a service be necessary? The chief executive of the NHS has said that doctors wrongly suspended should receive financial compensation for the harm done despite his claim that suspension is a neutral act.3

Chief executives should be aware that whistleblowing may have hidden motives. Donaldson has shown that there is a more humane and less wasteful way of dealing with so called difficult doctors, which does not automatically lead to suspension.4

P J Tomlin, Honorary secretary
Society Clinical Psychiatrists Study Group, Downton, Wiltshire SP5 3HJ


  1. United Nations. Universal declaration of human rights. BMJ 1997; 315: 1455-1456[Free Full Text].
  2. Whistleblowing or character assassination. BMJ 1998; 316: 1756-1757[Free Full Text]. (6 June.)
  3. Langlands A. The suspension of Dr O'Connell. Committee of Public Accounts: fortieth report. London: HMSO, 1995:21.
  4. Donaldson L. Doctors with problems in an NHS workforce. BMJ 1994; 308: 1277-1282[Abstract/Free Full Text].


Benefits of openness and teamwork must be emphasised

EDITOR---I believe we must not condemn the actions of "bad doctors" as if they are isolated felons who take the responsibility entirely for themselves. Drs Wisheart and Dhasmana and those who chose to ignore the problem were or are part of the establishment1---an establishment that indirectly allows problems to go unchecked.

I feel ashamed to be a member of such a profession. The autonomy of the individual seems to be so important that suspicious fellow professionals have to take draconian steps with obvious damaging effects to the whole of the medical profession before something can be done. I would opt for the "less punishment but less crime" option---that is, a climate where small problems can be aired quickly and easily and no one is allowed to be totally isolated and autonomous.

Through initial and continuing medical education, universities and professional bodies should teach professionals the benefits of openness and teamwork. Emphasis should not be put on the ability to cope on one's own without recourse to colleagues. How often have anaesthetists like me had to intervene by sending for a more senior surgeon because the junior surgeon performing the operation thought that he or she would lose face in doing so? In an atmosphere where teamwork was the accepted norm, perhaps Drs Wisheart and Dhasmana would have considered that they could ask for the help and additional training (or careers advice) that they so desperately needed.

So where were the professional bodies of the surgeons and anaesthetists? We who elect their officers may wish to ask where they will be for us. Would we wish them to ignore our minor problems as they grow and speak only when the General Medical Council has pronounced on our case? Of course it is terrible to be falsely accused, especially when there seems to be little difference between absolute denial of the problem and formal proceedings. Discreet inquiries and perhaps an invitation for Drs Wisheart and Dhasmana to go on sabbatical to a centre with higher survival figures (if comparable), long before the problem got out of hand, would have been the best answer for both sinned against and sinners.

Doctors must stop the "I can cope on my own" routine and start a new era of openness.

Rachael Dawson, Senior house officer
Department of Anaesthetics, Queen Elizabeth Hospital, King's Lynn PE30 4ET

a rachael_dawson{at}mcmail.com


  1. Dyer C. Compensation claims expected to follow GMC's findings. BMJ 1998; 316: 1691[Free Full Text]. (6 June.)


Armed forces need independent civilian adviser who can be approached in confidence

EDITOR---I was interested to read the comments by "the great and the good" on the dilemma of the junior surgeon with an underperforming consultant.1 The guidance from the General Medical Council and the Senate of Surgery of Great Britain and Ireland is clear. 2 3 In reality, however, whistleblowing may not be an option.

A few years ago I was a junior in the armed forces. One of the consultants had a high complication rate for one procedure, and I was seriously concerned for the safety of his patients. My own consultant was aware of the problem and even joked about it. The consultant outranked me both professionally and militarily. Challenging the conduct of a superior is fraught with danger; as well as jeopardising one's career, one faces a real risk of being charged with insubordination. There was no mechanism by which I could safely express my concerns. Had I done so I am sure that the consequences for me would have been serious.

Had there been an independent civilian adviser who could be approached in complete confidence I would certainly have blown the whistle on this consultant.


  1. Five times: coincidence or something more serious? BMJ 1998; 316: 1736-1740[Free Full Text] [with comments by M Irving, D M Berwick, P Rubin, T Treasure]. (6 June.)
  2. General Medical Council. Duties of a doctor: good medical practice. London: GMC , 1995.
  3. The surgeon's duty of care. Guidance for surgeons on ethical and legal issues. London: Senate of Surgery of Great Britain and Ireland , 1997(Senate paper 2.)


Deaths are acceptable in some specialties but not all

EDITOR---Appropriately, we accept a certain failure rate in cardiac surgery.1 We generally believe that oncologists have done their best when their patients die. Psychiatrists and mental health teams, however, are put under tremendous pressure to prevent all deaths in their patients and receive blame and censure when their patients die.

A tenth of people with major depression and schizophrenia commit suicide. Do we really believe that all these deaths are avoidable? Many people have struggled bravely with distressing symptoms, a restricted life, and stigma from society over many years before choosing to die. Does major mental illness have a core mortality that cannot be decreased even in the best resourced and best run service? Are we holding people responsible, and even driving them out of their chosen specialty,2 for adverse events that they can do little to influence? I suspect so.

Alison J Gray, Senior registrar
Herefordshire Community Health NHS Trust, St Mary's Hospital, Hereford HR4 7RF


  1. Treasure T. Lessons from the Bristol case. BMJ 1998; 316: 1685-1686[Free Full Text]. (6 June.)
  2. Kendall RE, Pearce A. Consultant psychiatrists who retired prematurely in 1995 and 1996. Psychiatr Bull 1997; 21: 741-745.


Series of operations with low mortality may exhibit high average mortality by chance

EDITOR---Poloniecki showed some of the difficulties that may seriously mislead when perioperative mortality statistics are being interpreted.1 He chose an example from cardiac surgery, a high risk specialty with a national average perioperative mortality of 25%. Those difficulties are much increased and new ones are introduced when mortality in most other surgical specialties is assessed because the average mortality for major elective procedures is usually much less that 4%. In 1988 a colleague and I showed that even large series of operations with a low mortality may exhibit two or three times the average mortality by chance alone (table).2

[Abstract/Free Full Text]
                              
View this table:
[in this window]
[in a new window]
 

Estimated sample sizes to show significance of excursions away from average perioperative mortality (number of operations for which excursion is estimated to have 5% probability of occurring by chance)

When an individual surgeon's performance of a particular operation is being assessed a series extending over several (or perhaps many) years, beginning at consultant appointment, would be needed if the assessment is not to be distorted merely by chance. If, as Poloniecki suggests, a second assessment period might be required (maybe after a complaint to the General Medical Council) the delay before professional conduct could be properly assessed would be absurdly long. Little seems to have been done to collect any data (complete or even estimated by sampling) on national average mortality for specific major operative procedures except in cardiothoracic surgery.

The public's interest in the performance of individual surgeons is understandable. But for politicians and some health economists to have pretended that an assessment based on a comparison of individual surgeons' crude mortality with national averages will improve the public's confidence in the NHS seems about as sensible as proposing to dispense justice by using the random number generator of the National Lottery.

Roger Hole, Retired consultant urologist
Wynd House, Hutton Rudby, North Yorkshire TS15 0ES


  1. Poloniecki JD. Half of all doctors are below average. BMJ 1998; 316: 1734-1736[Free Full Text]. (6 June.)
  2. Hole R, Haywood JK. Auditing perioperative mortality. Ann R Coll Surg Engl 1988; 3: 184.


Concept of collective responsibility is important

EDITOR---In the wake of the General Medical Council's findings on the three doctors in the Bristol case, Klein and the media pose the question whether information regarding the performance of individual consultants should be available to the public.1 This is at a time when consultants, particularly cardiothoracic surgeons, feel isolated, vulnerable, and subject to blame. Focusing excessively on individual performance promotes risk averse behaviour throughout the NHS. Risk averse behaviour encompasses views such as "although professionally capable, I am not going to do this because I might be blamed for something." Such risk averse behaviour will lead to barriers within the NHS: doctors versus nurses, doctors versus managers, doctor versus doctor, and ultimately doctor versus patient. Barriers within an organisation allow blame to be shifted away from the many on to a few.

Focusing in isolation on individual consultants' performance is a retrograde step. In contrast, effective communication and collective responsibility are behaviours that remove divisions and optimise the quality of an organisation. The absence of barriers within an organisation engenders a natural openness and confidence in its dealings with its customers. Each patient should have unequivocal information about the results of an organisation (trust or department) as a whole. The availability of institutional or departmental data engenders collective responsibility; the availability of data for an individual does not. If the concept of collective responsibility is acquired by independent professionals (nurses and doctors in the NHS) the organisational disaster that occurred in Bristol will be prevented in the future.

Jim Egan, Consultant respiratory physician
North West Lung Centre, Wythenshawe Hospital, Manchester M23 9LT JJGEgan{at}aol.com


  1. Klein R. Competence, professional self regulation, and the public interest. BMJ 1998; 316: 1740-1742. (6 June.)


General Medical Council's disciplinary hearings should be confidential

EDITOR---The quasi-judicial style of the General Medical Council's disciplinary proceedings, which were much publicised in the long running Bristol case,1 seems to have much in common with the procedures followed in the courts. It is therefore a matter of both surprise and concern that, unlike the embargo on press comment for court hearings, the media can indulge in speculative comment before a council's hearing has been completed, the verdict of the disciplinary committee has been announced, and professional misconduct has been established or refuted. The General Medical Council needs to retain the confidence of the profession and the public as it addresses the crucial issue of self regulation for doctors. If the outcomes of its proceedings are to be seen as fair and balanced rather than as trials by the media, this loophole must be closed as a matter of urgency.

The council may have part of the remedy. There does not seem to be a good reason for allowing an interval of over two weeks between the announcement by the council of its findings in the cases brought against the three doctors and the final hearing to decide on their fitness to practise.

Douglas Lee, Consultant in transfusion medicine
National Blood Service Lancaster, PO Box 111, Royal Lancaster Infirmary, Lancaster LA1 4GT


  1. Dyer C. Compensation claims expected to follow GMC's findings. BMJ 1998; 316: 1691. (6 June.)


Returning contracts to regional level might prevent such cases

EDITOR---Much has been written in both the medical and the lay press about the Bristol cases.1 Proposals have been made---some sensible, some less so---to ensure that such a situation does not recur. I have seen no mention, however, of what I believe to have been an important contributory factor---the moving of consultant contracts to hospital level as part of the setting up of trusts.

A situation in which clinicians and members of the employing authority work together on a daily basis in a relatively closed community may well lead to problems: the natural tendency of an autonomous organisation is to close ranks when faced with possible adverse publicity. The courage, persistence, and career sacrifice required of a person who is prepared to step out of line in the interest of patients have been clearly shown.2

A return to the system in which our contracts were held at a higher level, such as the region, would be a simple and inexpensive measure that would help prevent such situations developing to the point of disaster. The Bristol case is the most publicised such case, and rightly so because of the loss of young lives. But there have been several other places where long and damaging disputes have built up because the case had become "too local" and personalities were too important.

Peter Fisher, President
NHS Consultants' Association, Great Bourton, Banbury, Oxfordshire OX17 1QH


  1. Treasure T. Lessons from the Bristol case. BMJ 1998; 316: 1685-1686. (6 June.)
  2. Dyer C. Compensation claims expected to follow GMC's findings. BMJ 1998; 316: 1691. (6 June.)


Airline pilots are assessed every six months, so why shouldn't doctors be?

EDITOR---Seeing the television coverage of the angry crowd's reaction to James Wisheart and his discredited surgical colleagues1 prompted me to voice my concern about measuring deaths to improve surgery in England. Waiting for a surgeon to kill enough people until, after standardisation for case mix and severity, the death rate of his patients is statistically higher than that of colleagues, is like shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted. At this point many patients would have died and the surgeon's professional reputation and probably whole life would have been irreparably destroyed.

My husband is an airline pilot, one of a group of professionals who are carefully monitored. Every six months he is assessed by a senior training captain in a flight simulator. The simulator test includes a variety of technical and managerial problems. Pilots who fail it have to go through retraining. Those who continue to fail can no longer fly. This system seems appealing to me. After all, it would be ridiculous to monitor the number of passengers whom a single pilot had killed in comparison with his colleagues before action was taken to remedy his flying skills.

In medicine we need regular assessment of our skills by respected and senior colleagues. Such a system has been started for public health doctors in the West Midlands. The quality of the work we do and the effectiveness and efficiency of the management in our departments are reviewed annually. I for one would rather be told that my professional skills were not suitably in line with modern standards, should this ever be the case, before the population of Shropshire began to die unnecessarily as a result.

I agree with the BMA that self regulation is important2 and that our professional skills should be assessed by other doctors in our specialty. If doctors were unable to listen and heed advice during such processes, however, then management would have to act. I cannot believe that an airline would allow pilots to continue flying its passengers if, after assessment by their senior professional colleagues, they were considered unfit to fly.

Rosemary J Geller, Director of public health
Shropshire Health Authority, Shrewsbury, Shropshire SY3 8XL


  1. Dyer C. Compensation claims expected to follow GMC's findings. BMJ 1998; 316: 1691. (6 June.)
  2. Johnson J. Making self regulation credible. BMJ 1998; 316: 1847-1848[Free Full Text]. (20 June.)


Supraregional neonatal cardiac surgery works in Western Australia

EDITOR---Having read Treasure's editorial about the lessons to be drawn from the Bristol case,1 we wish to put the case for supraregional neonatal cardiac surgery despite extreme distances. Western Australia has a population of 1.8 million with an incidence of congenital heart disease of 7.65/1000 live births. A mean of nine infants a year require cardiac surgical intervention with cardiopulmonary bypass in the neonatal period. These infants are transported in commercial aircraft by the Western Australian Neonatal Transport Service from Perth to the Royal Children's Hospital, Melbourne.

The distance between the hospitals is nearly 3000 km, and the trip lasts six hours. The infant travels in a transport incubator with inbuilt ventilator and infusion pumps attached. Monitoring is by electrocardiography and pulse oximetry, with blood pressure and blood gas tensions being measured. The medical escort is a paediatric registrar or consultant or a neonatal intensive care nurse, or both. The infant's parent(s) usually travel on the same flight.

We have recently conducted an audit of 10 years of interstate transports to assess mortality and morbidity.2 The largest subgroup in this audit comprised 46 patients with transposition of the great arteries. The first arterial switch operation was performed in Melbourne in 1983. The unit currently performs an average of 30 switch operations each year, in a catchment population of 10 million. Between January 1986 and December 1995, all 46 patients with transposition of the great arteries had the arterial switch operation. Of these patients, seven were ventilated and 17 had prostaglandin E1 infusions. The one year survival was 100%, and the current cohort survival is 98% (45/46). This compares favourably with quoted rates in Treasure's editorial.1 The youngest patient in this group is now 21/2 years old and the oldest 12. Initial developmental follow up data on 43 of the patients shows a 7% incidence of important problems, three patients having borderline intellectual function or hemiplegia, or both. Again, such figures compare well with those in other published reports3 and show that Western Australians are served well by current management with supraregional transfer.

The financial costs of interstate travel and accommodation for the parents are paid by the state health department. Although the parents of infants who are transported over ultralong distances suffer additional emotional costs, they benefit as a group from the excellent survival rates of their infants.

Katharine Gardiner, Senior registrar, department of neonatology
Patrick J Pemberton, Head, department of neonatology
Jim Ramsay, Head, department of cardiology
Princess Margaret Hospital, PO Box D184, Perth, 6001, Western Australia

b patrick.pemberton{at}health.wa.gov.au


  1. Treasure T. Lessons from the Bristol case. BMJ 1998; 316: 1685-1686. (6 June.)
  2. Gardiner KH, Pemberton P, Ramsay JM. Audit of neonatal cardiac transport, Perth to Melbourne, 1986 to 1995. Proceedings of the 2nd annual congress of the Perinatal Society of Australia and New Zealand; 29 Mar-2 Apr 1998. Alice Springs: Perinatal Society of Australia and New Zealand, 1998:180.
  3. Hovels-Gurich HH, Seghaye MC, Dabritz S, Messmer BJ, von Bernuth G. Cognitive and motor development in pre-school and school-aged children after neonatal arterial switch operation. J Thorac Cardiovasc Surg 1997; 114: 578-585[Abstract/Free Full Text].


Techniques for measuring quality of care need to be assessed

EDITOR---I agree that we should be concerned about providing the best quality care possible, and we should do what we can to improve health care. But hard questions should be asked about the planned solutions to the Bristol cases. It is easy to jump on the Bristol bandwagon1; what happened there was wrong, but will the suggested solutions improve health care? And would they have prevented what happened?

It is disturbing that a failed suggestion from the United States---publishing hospital mortality league tables---is the prime consideration.2 The concept of a Commission for Health Improvement is likewise noble, but inspecting hospitals every three or four years indicates a role similar to that of the Office for Standards in Education in Britain, which has been criticised for expensive and contradictory outcomes. Attempts in the United States to measure quality of care have foundered, usually because of inability to take account of severity of illness. 2 3 When attempts to stratify for disease severity are used, major limitations become apparent---for example, the data collected are amenable to manipulation, are unreliable, or ignore important outcome variables.4

I applaud and support any research into how quality should be measured. But it is research and should be subjected to the same rigour as a new medicine is. Is there evidence that quality is measured? Is outcome improved? And, as for any new product, what is the cost? At present, such expensive and time consuming techniques are not developed enough for general use; as for any medical advance, we should wait for the evidence base that these procedures do improve quality of care and are cost effective.

Dennis Briley, Consultant neurologist
Stoke Mandeville Hospital NHS Trust, Aylesbury, Buckinghamshire HP21 8AL


  1. Keogh BE, Dussek J, Watson D, Magee P, Wheatley D. Public confidence and cardiac surgical outcome. BMJ 1998; 316: 1759-1760[Free Full Text]. (13 June.)
  2. Blumenthal D. Part 1: quality of care---what is it? N Engl J Med 1996; 335: 891-894[Free Full Text].
  3. Lanska D, Hartz AJ. Measurement of quality in health care. Neurology 1998; 50: 584-587[Free Full Text].
  4. Hinchey JA, Furlan AJ, Frank JI, Kay R, Misch D, Hill C. Is in-hospital stroke mortality an accurate measure of quality of care? Neurology 1998; 50: 619-625[Abstract/Free Full Text].


Students must be taught more about ethics

EDITOR---Taken with his letter in a previous issue,1 Johnson's editorial on self regulation is another nail in its coffin.2 His concern in "making self regulation credible" is to make it credible to doctors, not the public. In his letter he complained that the BMJ's use of a photograph of a bereaved Bristol parent sensationalised the issue.1 Maybe he saw only the model coffin in the picture. But doctors need to be reminded of the depth of sorrow and anger in that mother's eyes---the natural response when your child died unnecessarily.

It is the sorrow and anger caused by doctors to real, live people that self regulation must address. Patients with all their emotions have to be at the centre of self regulation---not some mechanically performed peer review. Johnson's editorial may read well in the corridors of medical politics, but it gives no comfort to patients trying to deal with the General Medical Council.

Last week I met a couple who had just been told that it would take the General Medical Council at least 12 months to decide whether to start disciplinary proceedings against a doctor. A year or more, that is, not from the time of their complaint but from delivery of a dossier that they had assembled at its request. The dossier consists of nearly 1000 pages of evidence supporting their complaint that one of their children died, and another was left severely brain damaged, as a result of being used without their consent in a research project.

Nor does the editorial give hope that the General Medical Council will better fulfil its statutory responsibility for medical education so that doctors will be trained not to abuse and misuse their patients. One possible approach is to teach students more of the humanities and, in particular, about ethics. Recognising this, the council instructed medical schools to teach medical ethics over a decade ago. Yet it has not withdrawn approval from those schools that still have no regular medical ethics teaching, one of which (the Middlesex/University College London) is right on its own doorstep.

If leaders of the profession are incapable of recognising the centrality of patients and their experiences to self regulation, this extraordinary privilege will be taken away from us.

Richard Nicholson, Editor
Bulletin of Medical Ethics, London N5 1LA

c Bulletin_of_Medical_Ethics{at}compuserve.com


  1. Johnson JN. Cover picture meant that BMJ had descended to level of tabloid newspapers. BMJ 1998; 316: 1831[Free Full Text]. (13 June.)
  2. Johnson JN. Making self regulation credible. BMJ 1998; 316: 1847-1848. (20 June.)


Bristol case highlights potential weaknesses of Calman system

EDITOR---The Bristol case has implications for clinical governance, audit, management, and the provision of services, 1 2 but what are the implications for specialist training? Having a rigorous training before acquiring independent contractor status is the ideal way to ensure high standards, as is acquiring self directed skills of learning and self criticism. Although this represents the traditional method of training in the United Kingdom and has generally led to a fairly high standard, some changes are now inevitable.

How does the Calman programme of specialist training fit these new demands?3 In many specialties the time available for training has been reduced. Additionally, on call rotas are being made less onerous as a result of European Union directives. Although training schemes are becoming better structured, these measures may lead to young specialists being well trained but less experienced than young specialists were previously. As a result, training posts have been set up for doctors who have gained a certificate of completion of specialist training. Another challenge will be for consultants to demonstrate their track record to patients and purchasers of care. How will a newly appointed specialist be able to do this without a sustained period under the proctorship of a more senior established colleague? Does this mean that "junior" consultants are inevitable?

The Bristol case highlights a further potential weakness of the Calman system in that some of the poor results were attributed to one surgeon having received most of his training under a senior colleague who himself later came under scrutiny. Previously, specialists spent time in two or three centres; in the Calman system a specialist's training might well be centred in one region. Therefore rotations are vital, and exchanges with other centres in different regions and travelling fellowships overseas will become important.

Close audit of both the trainees' and the trainers' case mix and outcomes is essential. This might best be supervised by the appropriate specialist society under the aegis of the royal colleges and postgraduate deans. This will particularly apply to complex and subspecialist work, for which the first direct exposure might previously have been as a newly appointed consultant. Supervised training has implications for time, resources, and throughput of patients. How will established consultants acquire new skills and techniques safely? Proctorships and sabbatical leave to other centres followed by close audit may be the only acceptable solution and yet have many consequences for the provision of services.

The training of specialists presents the medical profession with major challenges. Failure to meet these will jeopardise the whole ethos of self regulated postgraduate medical education.

Anjan K Banerjee, Consultant surgeon
Royal Halifax Infirmary, Halifax HX1 2YP


  1. Klein R. Competence, professional self regulation, and the public interest. BMJ 1998; 316: 1740-1742. (6 June.)
  2. Treasure T. Lessons from the Bristol case. BMJ 1998; 316: 1685-1686. (6 June.)
  3. Department of Health. Hospital Doctors - Training for the future. The report of the Working Group on Specialist Medical Training. London: DoH , 1993(Calman report.)


Private practice has similar problems

EDITOR---I applaud the sentiments in Smith's editorial, but the focus seems to be on NHS medicine.1 An equal focus should be applied to private practice, where the motivation for inappropriate and excessive treatment is financial.

It was reported in BMA News Review that private practice could come under scrutiny by the Commons health select committee during the next parliamentary session, and David Hinchliffe MP was quoted as saying, "There is serious concern that certain operations, primarily in the private sector, are not performed by those sufficiently qualified to do so." I would suggest that unnecessary operations are a greater problem, some being performed by doctors who have had only basic training in the techniques while they were passing though a specialty.

The Bristol case has given every chairman of every medical advisory committee of every private hospital a great responsibility---that of "policing" his or her colleagues' activity in the private sector. Moral support and advice are readily available from the General Medical Council, as I have recently found, and the medical director of the local NHS trust would also be an appropriate person to speak to.

What does one do if a colleague who is not an orthopaedic surgeon or hand surgeon operates on Dupytren's contractures, or a colleague who is not a plastic surgeon performs breast reductions, or a colleague who is not a gynaecologist inappropriately operates on genital prolapse? What do you do if a colleague always finds something to operate on no matter what the patient is referred with? And what do you say to the anaesthetist who always puts in a regional block as well as giving a general anaesthetic in order to bump up the fee? It astounds me that the medical insurance companies themselves have not policed these sorts of activities in order to reduce their own financial outgoings. All of these examples are observed every week by all of us who have our eyes open. Worse, they are obvious to our nursing and paramedical colleagues, who wonder why we are doing nothing to correct these anomalies.

Smith concluded his editorial with the spectre of micromanagement of doctors. It is therefore urgent that we put our own house in order and do not lose the impetus for change that the Bristol case has produced.

Beverley Webb, Chairman of medical advisory committee
Pinehill Hospital, Hitchin, Hertfordshire SG4 9QZ


  1. Smith R. All changed, changed utterly. BMJ 1998; 316: 1917-1918. (27 June.)
  2. GP crisis wins Commons scrutiny. BMA News Review , 1998 Jun 13:13.


Formal mentoring might have helped

EDITOR---One additional point that I think needs to be made after the Bristol case1 is how we are adequately to support doctors, particularly consultants. Senior doctors and particularly consultants (in all specialties) carry enormous loads; these are not only of basic clinical care and decision making but also managerial and educational roles; counselling roles for both patients, their families, and junior doctors; terminal and palliative care; and many other endless demands. In many other professions sensible arrangements have been made about mentorship and supervision of work in order to support people doing these difficult jobs---for example, in social work and psychology.

We need to help doctors by providing a much more structured form of mentorship or supervision to support them in the work they do. Otherwise we will continue to use our informal mentors of family and friends to share this load. If some formal mentoring or supervisory system had been in place for Mr Wisheart and colleagues, these doctors might have been able to express their anxieties and concerns about their surgical work; formal steps might then have been taken to address these issues. The current system clearly fails and does not allow such expression.

N Gainsborough, Consultant physician
Department of Medicine for the Elderly, Brighton General Hospital, Brighton BN2 3EW


  1. Treasure T. Lessons from the Bristol case. BMJ 1998; 316: 1685-1686. (6 June.)


Roles of GMC, royal colleges, and Department of Health remain unclear

EDITOR---As Treasure and Klein point out, one the main questions arising from the Bristol inquiry is why so many warning signals went unheeded. 1 2 In particular, although audit data from the United Kingdom cardiac surgery register seemed to raise questions about the performance of the Bristol unit, they were not acted on. In some ways this is not surprising. When audit was first introduced there was great reluctance to associate it with policies for professional accountability. One of the consequences was that royal colleges had no mechanisms in place to act on the findings of the national and regional audits they commissioned. Research on the audit programme of the Royal College of Physicians, undertaken in the early 1990s, found that audit had the characteristics of a research activity---owned by the individuals undertaking the work, disseminated by them through publication in journals, and presented at scientific meetings.3 At that time the Royal College of Physicians had no organisational mechanisms for dealing with the findings of audit.

The differing roles of the General Medical Council, the royal colleges, and the Department of Health in relation to the accountability of doctors remains unclear. The "rapid response" system being set up by the Royal College of Surgeons is clearly a step forward, but whether royal colleges will be able to set up organisational structures robust enough for rigorous peer review remains to be seen.

Susan Kerrison, Researcher
8 Ellesmere Road, London NW10 1JR


  1. Treasure T. Lessons from the Bristol case. BMJ 1998; 316: 1685-1686. (6 July.)
  2. Klein R. Competence, professional self regulation, and the public interest. BMJ 1998; 316: 1740-1742. (6 July.)
  3. Kerrison SH, Packwood T, Buxton M. Review of supra hospital audit in medical specialities. Uxbridge: Health Economics Research Group, Brunel University: 1994.


Routine monitoring of mishaps would be valuable way of improving care

EDITOR---Smith states that cardiothoracic surgeons are well ahead of the pack in providing data on performance and that non-surgical specialties "are going to have to think hard and fast" about how to follow suit.1 Outcomes in medical specialties relate to diagnoses and treatments that are less clearly defined than operations. An accurate diagnosis based on agreed standard criteria is essential if valid comparisons are to be made. Comorbidity and other confounding factors must also be recorded. These constraints require both the diagnostic process and coding to be comprehensive and reliable, which they are not. Diagnoses may be uncertain and remain so, or provisional and clarified only after discharge.

Death is the easiest outcome to record; other adverse outcomes such as symptoms and disability are impossible to monitor routinely without a vast increase in resources. The cause of death is often uncertain and may be unrelated to the stated diagnosis. Necropsies are essential to determine both the cause of death and the accuracy of the original diagnosis, but rates of necropsy are low2 and, because of the shortage of pathologists, unlikely to increase. Death rates will be meaningless unless data on both diagnosis and cause of death are accurate. Moreover, few conditions have sufficiently high death rates for comparisons to be statistically valid. Collection of data for comparison between hospitals can thus have only a limited place. Improved internal audit and external peer review are far better options, and our royal college could have a strong role in both.

Routine monitoring of mishaps would be a valuable way of improving care. Many errors occur that are known only to the clinical staff involved unless a formal complaint is made or an incident form completed. Doctors may not be informed of their errors because of shifts, transfer of care to another team, or the problem being discovered after discharge. Mismanagement may be identified by other units in the same hospital or elsewhere. 3 4 Adverse outcomes may be due to delays,3 problems with communication and filing, or lack of resources, especially of nurses and beds. Staff must be encouraged to report untoward events. The information can be used to identify repeating problems and areas for audit, to improve organisation, and to enhance education and audit. It would also strengthen the case for more resources.

R H Lloyd-Mostyn, Consultant physician
King's Mill Centre for Health Care Resources, Sutton in Ashfield, Nottinghamshire NH17 4JL


  1. Smith R. All changed, changed utterly. BMJ 1998; 316: 1917-1918. (27 June.)
  2. Chana J, Rhys-Maitland R, Hon P, Scott P, Thomas C. Who asks permission for an autopsy? J R Coll Phys 1990; 24: 185-188.
  3. Husband DJ. Malignant spinal cord compression: prospective study of delays in referral and treatment. BMJ 1998; 317: 18-21[Abstract/Free Full Text]. (4 July.)
  4. McQuillan P, Pilkington S, Allan A, Taylor B, Short A, Morgan G, et al. Confidential enquiry into quality of care before admission to intensive care. BMJ 1998; 316: 1853-1858[Abstract/Free Full Text]. (20 June.)


Doctors have surely forfeited privilege of self regulation

EDITOR---The General Medical Council's ruling concerning the paediatric heart surgeons in Bristol must raise the whole question of the propriety and effectiveness of self regulation by the medical profession.1 I would suggest that the signal failure by senior members of the profession to provide support for and ensure the health and welfare of so many of their junior hospital staff---often putting patients' safety at risk---must now result in forfeiture of the privilege of self regulation.

Michael Ashley-Miller, Retired secretary, Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust
28 Fitzwarren Gardens, London N19 3TP


  1. Dyer C. Compensation claims expected to follow GMC's findings. BMJ 1998; 316: 1691. (6 June.)


Poor performers will need remedial training

EDITOR---Who will help "poor performers" back into practice? This is a question that, curiously, seems to be skirted. The General Medical Council is now empowered to assess a medical practitioner's performance after valid concerns have been expressed by patients, peers, other clinicians, or health management about a doctor's clinical practice. The advice is clear: a doctor should "act quickly to protect patients from risk."1 Removal from the medical register for not doing so is possible. The publicity about the Bristol case does not help matters. Although whistleblowing remains awkward, attitudes are changing: silent tolerance of poor clinical practice is no longer considered honourable.

Assessment, conducted by trained assessors, comprises interviews with the doctor, evidence from third parties (complainants and colleagues), and review of clinical records. A second phase will include objective tests of knowledge, attitudes, and skills. The assessors may recommend a period of remedial training. If the doctor is unable to improve or refuses to cooperate with a process of remedial training, suspension of his or her registration may occur.2 But the remedial process is not clear.

Although there is a recognition that the postgraduate system "is well placed to offer advice and practical support"3 and an assumption that it will do so,4 there is no requirement to do so and no clear guidance.5 How realistic is this assumption? Providing remedial education is likely to be a highly specialised task but unfamiliar to most educationalists. Should they accept this role?

The need to provide remedial training will probably occur infrequently. But the low numbers envisaged mean that no one is likely to gain enough experience to provide acceptable remedial training in his or her field. The issues involved in mentoring, monitoring, and documentation are vague, and providing protected time for supervision has high opportunity costs. Poor performers are also likely to have complex problems, including conflicts within professional relationships.

The General Medical Council's firm lead on professional self regulation is welcome progress towards the setting of minimum standards. But identification and assessment are only the start. Remedial training has received little attention so far. Although some debate continues about funding,4 poor performers are widely expected to be responsible for the costs. Why should the taxpayer contribute twice to the establishment of a minimum level of professional competence? The most likely result of facing the performance procedures will probably be a swift move towards early retirement. So why bother setting up complex, expensive facilities for remedial training?

Glyn J Elwyn, Senior lecturer in general practice
Malcolm Lewis, GMC performance assessor
University of Wales College of Medicine, Cardiff CF4 4XN

d elwynG{at}cf.ac.uk


  1. General Medical Council. The duties of a doctor. London: GMC , 1997.
  2. General Medical Council. The management of doctors with problems: referral of doctors to the GMC's fitness to practise procedures. London: GMC , 1997.
  3. NHS Executive. The management of doctors with problems: guidance on the role of the NHS in the GMC's performance procedures and the rehabilitation of doctors. Leeds: NHSE , 1997.
  4. NHS Executive. GMC performance procedures: guidelines for the provision of advice and professional support to facilitate the rehabilitation of doctors. Leeds: NHSE , 1997.
  5. Rotherham G, Martin D, Joesburty H, Mathers N. Measures to assist GPs whose performance gives cause for concern. Sheffield: School of Health and Related Research , 1997.

© BMJ 1998

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