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BMJ 2005;330:1390 (11 June), doi:10.1136/bmj.330.7504.1390-b
| The first 150 words of the full text of this article appear below. |
EDITORAccording to Gill et al, clinicians are natural bayesians.1 Their reasoning about patients is intuitive, probabilistic, and reiterative. Such subjective, context dependent reasoning is integral to clinical judgment and useful when diagnosing rare diseases.
In the same issue, the fictional Dr House is described.2 He, too, must be bayesian. He solves rare cases intuitively through flashes of grim insight, this occurring against a backdrop of reiteration: obscure diagnoses are hurled back and forth. He is also likened to fictional detectives, which is interesting because the detective model of clinical judgment has already been described.3 At its core is the collection of evidence about the patient's condition by the clinician, who interprets and reinterprets this in a context dependent way, such evidence being given due weight and accepted or rejected according to the coherence it brings to the diagnostic picture.
It therefore seems that the detective and bayesian models
Roger N Chitty, consultant psychiatrist
Cherrybank Resource Centre, Ellesmere Port, Cheshire CH65 0BY joanne.harding@cwpnt.nhs.uk