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BMJ 2003;327:105 (12 July), doi:10.1136/bmj.327.7406.105
| The first 150 words of the full text of this article appear below. |
EDITORIn response to my paper Kunkler disagrees that telling people emphatically that "the best treatment is unknown" suppresses sophisticated questioning by the patient.1 2 But this was not my opinion: I was merely quoting what Donovan et al reported in their original paper.3 I was therefore pleased that instead of following Donovan et al's injunction to be unequivocal about uncertainty Hamdy et al give those invited to the ProtecT study "precise information on risks and benefits of treatments based on current evidence for particular tumours."2
Yet Frankel et al describe such "prior" information not by the
conventional term belief but by the pejorative term
prejudice.2 From
global warming to the chance of rain tomorrow we form stronger or weaker
beliefs, and it is perfectly rational to use these in decision making, even
when the evidence falls short of proof. So, Hamdy et al are quite right to
vary what
Richard J Lilford, professor of clinical epidemiology
Department of Public Health and Epidemiology, Public Health Building, University of Birmingham, Birmingham B15 2TT r.j.lilford@bham.ac.uk