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EDITOR
In their editorial describing the interim smallpox guidelines
for the United Kingdom Harling et al ask how countries lacking the
public health infrastructure to respond to outbreaks and without
vaccine supplies would be able to control an outbreak of
smallpox.1
Confronted with the threat of intentional release of biological agents, the World Health Organization advocates dual use investment in public health infrastructure to strengthen outbreak intelligence and verification, support the response to an outbreak, maintain an emergency vaccine reserve, and provide public health information.
In 2002 the World Health Assembly urged countries to share
expertise, supplies, and resources, and asked WHO to develop collective mechanisms to contain or mitigate the impact of such a global health
threat.2 Since the successful eradication programme ended
in 1979 WHO has managed an emergency stockpile of smallpox vaccine,
which now consists of some 500 000 doses.3 Access to
stockpiled vaccine is restricted to containing epidemiologically
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